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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1941-1942*
I. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS
AS THE work of clearing up the affairs of the closed banks
progresses, problems begin to arise with regard to the
possible right of shareholders who have paid their statu-
tory super-added liability to secure refunds. The action, in
Burket v. Reliance Bank & Trust Company,' denying such
a shareholder the right to claim satisfaction of a judgment
pronounced against him, even though amounts collected
from others in his class had been sufficient to cover all un-
paid liabilities arising during the period of stock ownership,
was given a logical extension in Holderman v. Moore State
Bank.' In that case, certain shareholders, having paid their
assessment in full, sought a refund on the ground that the
amount collected from them exceeded the amount of unpaid
liabilities due depositors who held claims against the closed
bank during the period of their stock ownership.' The court,
nevertheless, dismissed such petition on the ground that the
*The present survey is not intended in any sense as a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past
year, but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention merely to cases
and developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is
that of the judicial year, embracing from 376 Ill. 486 to 379 Ili. 625; from 310 Ill.
App. 486 to 314 I1. App. 574; and from 119 F. (2d) 785 to 127 F. (2d) 864.
1 306 Ill. App. 563, 29 N. E. (2d) 297 (1940).
2 313 Ill. App. 299, 40 N. E. (2d) 97 (1942).
3 The facts disclosed that the total of depositors claims during the period of
stock ownership was $25,428.46. Of this total, the liquidating receiver had realized
and paid $16,019.33 from assets of the closed bank, computed at the rate of 63
cents per dollar on total claims allowed. Against a balance of $9,408.53 still due
such depositors, the receiver in the stockholders liability suit had collected
$17,502. A refund of $8,093.47 was, therefore, sought on a pro-rata basis.
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liability of the shareholders, after judgment rendered, was to
the creditors generally and not to only a class or portion
thereof,4 hence, until all creditors had been paid in full, no
refund could be made. People ex tel. Barrett v. Farmers
State Bank of Irvington5 was distinguished on this ground.
In another banking case, O'Connell v. Chicago Park Dis-
trict,' the bank, to secure the deposits of a municipal cor-
poration, had pledged certain of its bonds with the defend-
ant pledgee. When the bank became insolvent, the pledgee
sold the bonds, applying a portion of the proceeds to satisfy
its claim for the deposit therein, and turned the balance over
to the bank receiver. An action was later instituted by the
receiver as in trover on the ground that, the pledge being
illegal,7 the conduct in selling the bonds so pledged amounted
to a conversion. Defendant moved to dismiss the suit on the
ground the same was barred by the statute of limitations,'
since more than five years had elapsed from the date of the
original pledge, though not from the date of sale. The trial
court granted such motion, its order was affirmed in the
appellate court,' and again affirmed by the Illinois Supreme
Court.' ° In arriving at this result, the court held that since
the pledge was unlawful in its inception, the holding of the
bonds was adverse from the moment the pledge was made
so as to give rise to an immediate cause of action, hence
sufficient to commence the running of the period of limita-
tion. This is the first time this issue has been before the
court, but the treatment accorded the depositors of the closed
bank seems unfortunate particularly since the illegal deposit
is not likely to be discovered prior to the appointment of a
receiver," by which time all chance of recovery thereon
may be gone.
4 Heine v. Degen, 362 Ill. 357, 199 N. E. 832 (1936).
5 371 Ill. 222, 20 N. E. (2d) 502 (1939).
6 376 Ill. 550, 34 N. E. (2d) 836 (1941), noted in 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 329, 21 Bost.
U. L. Rev. 713, 42 Col. L. Rev. 135, and 27 Iowa L. Rev. 131.
7 Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 354 Ill. 554, 188 N. E. 836 (1934), and
People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 IlM. 75, 197 N. E. 537 (1935).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 83, § 16.
9 305 IM. App. 294, 27 N. E. (2d) 603 (1940).
10 Farthing, J., and Murphy, J., each wrote dissenting opinions.
11 See People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75, 197 N. E. 537
(1935).
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By Section 104 of the Business Corporation Act 12 the Sec-
retary of State is prohibited from issuing a certificate of
authority to do business to any foreign corporation whose
name is the same as, or deceptively similar to, the name of
any domestic corporation or other foreign corporation al-
ready authorized to transact business in this state. It was
held, in Investors Syndicate of America v. Hughes,i8 that
such mandate was not alone provided to protect other cor-
porations from unfair competitive practices but was also in-
tended to protect the public from being deceived, hence the
willingness of a parent corporation that its subsidiary
should bear a deceptively similar name was not enough to
require the Secretary of State to issue the certificate of au-
thority. An attack on the same section of the statute, on the
ground that it was unconstitutional because the legislature
had failed to provide any adequate standard by which the
Secretary of State could interpret and apply the phrase "de-
ceptively similar," hence involved a delegation of legislative
power, was rejected on the ground that the words had a de-
finite and accepted meaning. 4 The case is also important
because the court upheld Section 148 of the act 5 which pro-
vides for a method of review of the decision of the Secretary
of State refusing to accept or approve any document sought
to be filed in his office. Though denominated an "appeal,"
the section does not impose administrative duties upon the
court 8 but rather provides for a trial de novo of the ques-
tion upon pleadings made up from the document sought to
be filed and the written disapproval thereof by the Secre-
tary of State. Upon the filing thereof in the proper court, the
case proceeds as would any justiciable controversy rather
than as a mere review of the administrator's decision. 17
12 IlL Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.104.
13 378 Ill. 413, 38 N. E. (2d) 754 (1942).
14 Though not there challenged on this ground, the power of the Secretary of
State to refuse a certificate was upheld in People ex rel. Felter v. Rose, 225 I1.
496, 80 N. E. 293 (1907), as applied to a not-for-profit corporation, and in Illinois
Watch Case Co. v. Pearson, 140 Ill. 423, 31 N. E. 400, 16 L. R. A. 429 (1892).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.148.
16 City of Aurora v. Schoberlein, 230 111. 496, 82 N. E. 860 (1907).
17 Analogous provisions may be found in Laws, 1911, p. 481, § 35, upheld in
Railroad & Warehouse Commission v. Litchfleld and Madison Railway Co., 267
111. 337, 108 N. E. 347 (1915), and Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 111-2/3, § 72, held con-
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The "alter-ego" theory of corporate existence, as applied
to a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary,
operated in reverse fashion in Superior Coal Company v.
Department of Finance,8 in which case the parent com-
pany, a steam railroad, objected to paying sales taxes upon
purchases of coal made by it from the subsidiary on the
ground that the transactions amounted to a mere interde-
partmental transfer of property and not a sale. Though the
pertinent facts showed that, to all intents and purposes, the
subsidiary was merely a department in the parental organi-
zation, receiving cost price for its product with all over-
head expenses borne by the parent, 9 nevertheless, the fact
of separate charters seemed enough to require a holding that
the transactions between the two were "sales" within the
meaning of the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act.2 ° The fact
that the parent received no economic benefit from maintain-
ing the subsidiary was brushed aside with the suggestion
that, if sales between affiliated corporations were to be ex-
empted from the tax, the argument should be addressed to
the General Assembly.
The same doctrine was also applied in Ruthfield v. Louis-
ville Fuel Company,2' where the plaintiff learned that a
claim against a dissolved corporation on certain bonds is-
sued by it could not be asserted against a newly-formed
corporation having the same name, even though the latter
had taken over the business of the former.22 In so deciding,
the court reaffirmed the proposition that suits against dis-
solved corporations must be brought within the period fixed
stitutional in People's Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 309 Ill. 40, 139
N. E. 867 (1923).
18 377 IMl. 282, 36 N. E. (2d) 354 (1941), noted in 22 Bost. L. Rev. 127 and 30
Geo. L. J. 90.
19 See, for example, Consolidated Indiana Coal Co. v. National Bituminous
Coal Commission, 103 F. (2d) 124 (1939), that the wholly-owned subsidiary of
another carrier was exempt from the operations of the Bituminous Coal Act of
1937, 15 U. S. C. A. § 833(1). Compare with Keystone Mining Co. v. Gray, 120 F.
(2d) 1 (1941).
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, CIL 120, § 440 et seq.
21 312 Ill. App. 415, 38 N. E. (2d) 832 (1942).
22 It should be noted that the action was predicated on the express promise to
pay contained in the bond. The court did not decide what result would follow had
the suit been one in fraud, or brought by a creditor seeking to discover assets
belonging to the dissolved corporation. On that point, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,
Ch. 32, § 157.69(e) and Ch. 121 , § 80(a).
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by statute, 23 and, if not, the authority of the agent upon
whom service may be made ceases, even though he may
be the registered agent for the successor corporation.
Of special interest to lawyers concerned with corporate
reorganizations is Friedberg v. Schultz, 24 in which case the
court held that the trustees under a voting trust could not
vote the shares held so as to elect directors whose terms
would outlast the duration of a voting trust created at the
time of the reorganization. The rationale of such decision is
not clear, but it would seem to place a limitation upon the
power of the registered stockholder to vote his shares which
is not contained in the statute25 nor justified on any other
ground. On a somewhat related question, it may be noted
that, in general, a corporation is not bound to respect the
rights of a transferee of shares until such person has com-
pleted the transfer by having his name registered on the
books of the corporation.26 In the same way, the pledgee of
shares receives no rights against the corporation unless the
shares are registered in his name as pledgee.27 The purpose
of registration is, of course, to provide notice to the corpora-
tion, but, according to Garvy v. Blatchford Calf Meal Co., 28
if the corporation has received notice by other means than
registration of the transfer, it may not thereafter pay divi-
dends to the registered holder or apply the same to the satis-
faction of his indebtedness to it in derogation of the rights of
such transferee or pledgee.29
The liability of directors has been given consideration in
two noteworthy cases. In one of them, McGuire v. Outdoor
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.94. See also Consolidated coal Co. v Flynn
Coal Co., 274 Ill. App. 405 (1934).
24 312 Ill. App. 171, 38 N. E. (2d) 182 (1941), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVrEw 269, 30 Ill. B. J. 378, and 41 Mich. L. Rev. 166 (1942).
25 Ill Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.34 provides that the term of office, for other
than initial directors, shall be from annual meeting to annual meeting, though
staggered terms may be sanctioned If by-laws have been adopted pursuant to Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.35.
26 Uniform Stock Transfer Act 1 3; IM. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 418.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.30.
28 119 F. (2d) 973 (1941).
29 Farbank v. Merchant's National Bank, 132 IMI. 120, 22 N. E. 524 (1889), had
announced the same view but was decided prior to the enactment of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act.
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Life Publishing Company,3 0 a foreign corporation not li-
censed to do business in this state, though in fact operating
here, had entered into a contract of employment with the
plaintiff. Having used plaintiff's services for a portion of the
time, the corporation wound up its affairs and ceased doing
business, resulting in the discharge of plaintiff without legal
reason. In a suit brought in Illinois for breach of such con-
tract, the plaintiff named the corporation and its board of
directors as defendants seeking to hold the latter liable
as for the debt of a partnership on the theory that, by trans-
acting business on behalf of an unlicensed foreign corpora-
tion, they had personally incurred such liability. It was held
that the complaint stated a good cause of action against the
individual defendants under the provisions of the 1919 Busi-
ness Corporation Act,"1 which was applicable to the facts of
the case, though no such liability has been carried over into
the present statute.3 2 The court intimated, however, that the
same rule could apply today on common law principles in-
dependent of any statutory provision.33
In the other, Aiken v. Insul,3 4 certain bondholders filed a
representative suit against the directors of a defunct cor-
poration seeking to impose personal liability for having de-
clared or assented to the declaration of dividends at a time
when the corporate capital was, or would thereby be, im-
paired. Certain of the directors, relying on the fact that the
actual declaration was made by an executive committee of
80 311 Ill. App. 267, 35 N. E. (2d) 817 (1941).
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 32, § 149; Laws, 1919, p. 348, § 149, reads: "If any
person or persons being, or pretending to be, an officer or agent or board of direc-
tors of any corporation ... shall assume to exercise corporate powers or use the
name of such corporation ... before it has been authorized to do business, under
the laws of this state, then they shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts
and liabilities made by them and contracted in the name of such corporation ...
and suits at law may be prosecuted therefor by creditors individually."
S2 III. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.125, merely provides that the unlicensed
foreign corporation doing business in this state shall not be permitted to use our
courts as plaintiff until license is secured, but does not invalidate acts done or
contracts made by such corporation, nor does it prevent such corporation from
defending any action brought against it.
33 See Joseph T. Ryerson & Son v. Shaw, 277 Ill. 524, 115 N.E. 650 (1917).
34 122 F. (2d) 746 (1941), noted in 30 11l. B. J. 338 and 26 Minn. L. Rev. 400.
Another aspect of the case, dealing with a question of release of liability, is dis-
cussed in 36 Ill. L. Rev. 898. See also DeMet's Inc. v. Insull, 122 F. (2d) 755 (1941).
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the board,3" moved to dismiss the complaint as* it applied to
them. An order granting such relief was reversed on the
ground that the delegation of responsibility to an executive
committee would not absolve the directors from the liability
specifically imposed on them by the statute.36 The liability
thereby imposed was also attacked on the ground that it
was penal in character and not enforcible in equity,3 7 but
it was found that the obligation was a mere private one,
similar, in many respects, to that of a surety." Another
attack, on the ground that the statutory attempt to create a
conclusive presumption of evidence 39 was unconstitutional, °
was likewise rejected because, the court held, even if such
presumption were unconstitutional, the other portions of the
statute, upon which liability depended, could be treated as
separate and independent, hence not subject to such criticism.
The liability of a charitable corporation, such as a hos-
pital, for the carelessness of its servants and agents has
generally been denied for the reason that, to permit recov-
ery for such torts, an improper diversion of trust funds would
be said to result.4 Where, however, the action grows out of
a valid contract entered into by such organization, even
though the breach may have been produced by carelessness,
no such rule is applied,42 although the result of the deci-
sion will accomplish the same diversion of trust funds. These
incongruous holdings have led to much dissatisfaction with
the rule as applied,43 but, according to the holding in Watt-
man v. St. Luke's Hospital Association," the Illinois courts
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.38.
36 IUl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.42.
37 Defendants. relied on Loverin v. McLaughlin, 161 Il. 417, 44 N.E. 99 (1896),
which involved an earlier statute than the present one.
38 But see M. H. Vestal Co. v. Robertson, 227 Ill. 425, 115 N.E. 629 (1917); In re
Beachy & Co., 170 F. 825 (1909).
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.42.
40 Carolene Products Co. v. McLaughlin, 365 11. 62, 5 N.E. (2d) 447 (1936).
41 Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 111. 381, 75 N.E. 991, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 556,
4 Ann. Cases 103 (1905).
42 Armstrong v. Wesley Hospital, 170 Ill. App. 81 (1912).
43 In President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. (2d) 810
at 812 (1942), the court said: "The cases are almost riotous with dissent. Reasons
are even more varied than results. These are earmarks of law in flux. They indi-
cate something wrong at the beginning or that something has become wrong
since then. They also show that correction, though in process, is incomplete."
44 314 Ill. App. 244, 41 N.E. (2d) 314 (1942).
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are not yet ready to surrender the principle, even though
the action be contractual in nature, if the gist of the claim is
the carelessness of the servants of the charitable corpora-
tion.4 5
Since the expiration of the period of the last survey, the
Illinois legislature has amended Section 2 of the Joint Rights
and Obligations Act 46 so as to allow corporations authorized
to do business in this state to pay or deliver profits, dividends,
or other rights to any of the several persons holding jointly,
with right of survivorship, any stocks, bonds, or other evi-
dence of indebtedness whether the other holders be living
or not, provided an agreement permitting such payment or
delivery is signed by all the persons to whom such evidence
is issued either at the time of the issuance thereof or sub-
sequent thereto."
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
But one case of significance dealt with doctrines of agency
law, that of Williams' Estate v. Tuch,4s in which a joint ten-
ant's interest in a bank account was construed to be a mere
agency. It appeared from the facts therein that an aged
woman had signed a joint tenancy agreement with her
grand-nephew respecting the former's checking account.
Upon her death, the executrix made claim to the balance
on deposit which proceeding was resisted by the surviving
joint tenant on the ground the proceeds inured to him. While
the joint tenancy agreement included a survivorship clause,
the evidence showed that the purpose of the decedent in
signing the agreement had been merely to enable the co-
tenant to pay her bills as they became due. It was, there-
fore, decided that the co-tenant had acquired only the right
to act as agent to issue checks against the account of the
decedent and that, upon the latter's death, the agency ter-
minated.49 Whatever legal title to the fund that may have
45 It is understood that Frankhauser, J., in a similar action in tort, recently
refused to extend the immunity to a charitable corporation which had taken out
liability insurance on the ground that no diversion of trust funds could occur since
the loss, if any, would fall on the insurance carrier. See his opinion filed in Shaleen
v. The Newberry Library, 39-S-11479, Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois.
46 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 76, § 2. 47 Laws 1941, I, 840.
48 313 Ill. App. 230, 39 N.E. (2d) 695 (1942).
49 Weber v. Bridgman, 113 N. Y. 600, 21 N.E. 985 (1889).
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become vested in the co-tenant by reason of these facts,
was held to be owned in trust for the benefit of the decedent's
estate.
LABOR LAW
In the realm of labor law, occasion was found to apply
the principles of the Swing 5 and the Meadowmoor5 ' cases,
along the lines laid down in the Ellingsen52 and Van Heck"
cases, in Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Un-
ion" and also in Baker v. Retail Clerks' International Pro-
tective Association.55 The Maywood case presented facts
closely paralleling those in the Ellingsen decision and dis-
position of the case rested squarely on that decision. The
facts in the Baker case, however, differed. In that case the
defendant union had requested the plaintiffs, who were hus-
band and wife, owners and proprietors of a delicatessen
which employed no outside help, to close their store at stat-
ed hours on weekday nights and not to open it at all on
Sundays, in accordance with regulations followed by the
union. Upon the plaintiffs' refusal, the defendants instituted
picketing and in connection therewith displayed a sign de-
scribing the plaintiffs as "Unfair to Organized Labor" and
orally stated the same thing to a number of plaintiffs' cus-
tomers. The plaintiffs sought and obtained an injunction in
the lower court restraining the picketing, which injunction,
on appeal, was set aside. Finding support in the facts of
Senn v. Tile Layers' Protective Union,56 the appellate court
concluded that the subject matter of the dispute "contains
elements of common interest, ' 57 and that consequently the
picketing was within the protection afforded to free speech
50 American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed.
513 (1941). See also 20 CHICArO-KENT LAw REvIEW 13.
51 Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 61
S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 497 (1941).
52 Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 377 Ill. 76, 35 N.E. (2d) 349 (1941).
53 2063 Lawrence Avenue Building Corporation v. Van Heck, 377 Ill. 37, 35 N.E.
(2d) 373 (1941).
54 313 IMi. App. 24, 38 N.E. (2d) 972 (1942).
55 313 Ill. App. 432, 40 N.E. (2d) 571 (1942).
56 301 U.S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 12.29 (1937), noted in 37 Col. L. Rev. 1227,
6 Fordham L. Rev. 474, 6 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 137, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 271, 4 Ohio St.
L. J. 110, and 1938 Wis. L. Rev. 170.
57 313 IlM. App. 432 at 435, 40 N.E. (2d) 571 at 573.
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by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
There is thus emerging a test to establish the "element of
common interest" which may serve to answer the question
as to just how broad the decision in the Swing case might
be.5 8
Following the lead set long ago by the federal courts, 9
the Appellate Court for the First District has now recognized
a union as an entity apart from its members. In Almon v.
American Carloading Corporation0 the plaintiffs, members
of a union, sued the union officials and the employer com-
pany for withholding checks allegedly belonging to the plain-
tiffs. The union officials directed the attorney retained by
the union, toward whose pay each union member contribut-
ed a fixed amount, to represent the union in the suit. The
plaintiffs then sought to have him removed as attorney on
the theory that he represented each of them through his
arrangement with the union and hence was "disqualified
from appearing on behalf of a part of the members of (the
organization) in any proceeding involving a dispute with
other members. "81 While the court recognized that
an attorney cannot serve two masters, it said:
The pleadings here disclose that the only defense interposed to this suit
is one made by direction of the joint council in behalf of the local union
.Notwithstanding earlier decisions to the contrary, the later and better
58 The right to confine even peaceful picketing "to the area of the industry
within which a labor dispute exists," has already been recognized. See Carpenters
& Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 785 (1942),
noted post this issue. One limitation on the scope of the Swing case is thereby
indicated.
59 United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 42 S. Ct.
570, 66 L. Ed. 975 (1922), first permitted suit against an unincorporated union in its
common name as an entity. See Rule 17b of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
28 U.S.C.A. following § 723c. For further developments on the point of federal
jurisdiction, however, see Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F. (2d) 115
(1932), affirmed on other grounds in 289 U.S. 103, 53 S. Ct. 549, 77 L. Ed. 1062 (1933).
See aso note in 42 Col. L. Rev. 1211.
60 312 Ill. App. 225, 38 N.E. (2d) 362 (1941), noted in 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1038.
McSurely, J., dissented on the ground that the attorney, not being a party to the
proceedings, was not entitled to appeal from the order disqualifying him from
acting as counsel. On this point, see People ex rel. Yohnka v. Kennedy, 367 Ill. 236,
10 N.E. (2d) 806 (1937). The facts of the case place it in advance of the position
taken in Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, 220 111. 355, 77 N.E. 176 (1906), where
it was held that the union might be adjudged guilty of contempt of court apart
from its officers. It appeared, however, that the union was incorporated: 220 Ill.
355 at 370, 77 N.E. 176 at 181.
61 312 Ill. App. 225 at 226, 38 N.E. (2d) 362 at 363.
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authorities are to the effect that associations such as the Joint Council
No. 25 and Local Union No. 710 have 'juristic personalities.'6 2
As a consequence it concluded, therefore, that the "relation-
ship of attorney and client does not now and never has
existed" between the attorney in question and any one of
the members of the union.
In a somewhat related situation the Federal District Court
held, in Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Associated Milk Deal-
ers,63 that while there can be little doubt that a labor union,
though unincorporated, is a legal entity, the union could
not maintain an action to recover for the benefit of the in-
dividual members of the union sums of money allegedly due
them under an award of arbitration. The court pointed out
that the union had not agreed under its contract to furnish
employees who would accept the award and work for the
wages specified therein. It simply obtained the agreement
of the employer to pay "the stipulated wages to such mem-
bers of the union as cared to accept employment on those
terms. ' 64 Though the union had an interest in the contract,
this interest did not, in the court's opinion, run to the extent
of protecting the rights of the individual members to com-
pensation.
Three other cases should be noted. In Anderson v. City of
Chicago65 it was held that the strikers in the Republic Steel
strike of 1937 did not constitute a mob, within the meaning
of an Act to Suppress Mob Violence, 66 so that an onlooker who
had been maliciously beaten by a member of the city police
force was not entitled, in an action against the city, to re-
cover damages under that statute. In Nathaniel v. Wilson &
Company67 it was held, in an action brought under the As-
signment of Wages Act,68 that "where a demand is made
(on the employer) under the act, suit brought and judgment
obtained and satisfied, the assignee before he can enforce
any further claim against the employer must serve another
62 312 IH. App. 225 at 229, 38 N.E. (2d) 362 at 364.
63 42 F. Supp. 584 (1941).
64 Ibid, at 585.
65 313 IMl. App. 616, 40 N.E. (2d) 601 (1942).
66 IlM. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 512-7.
67 310 Ill. App. 486, 34 N.E. (2d) 721 (1941).
68 IlM. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, §§ 39.1-39.9.
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demand on the employer."6 The decision of the appellate
court in People v. Maggi,70 noted last year, which held that
the Illinois Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act for women
and minors71 applied to beauty shop operators, was affirmed
by the Supreme Court.72
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The usual grist of compensation cases passed before the
courts for review but one case, that of Thornton v. Her-
man,73 involving Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, 74 stands out as of highest importance. It appeared
therein that plaintiff's intestate was killed through the neg-
ligence of the defendant. Both decedent and defendant were
in the employ of separate employers bound by the act. Upon
proceedings under the act the plaintiff had been awarded
$6,000 against the decedent's employer. Plaintiff thereafter
brought tort action for wrongful death against the defendant
employee. The defendant, to defeat such action, urged
that he was under the act and therefore not subject to suit
by plaintiff; that plaintiff had lost her right of action by
being paid an award; and that decedent's employer, who
had paid such award, had already started subrogation pro-
ceedings against the employer of defendant. Plaintiff nev-
ertheless recovered a judgment, which judgment was af-
firmed by the appellate court,7" two of the judges holding
that, on appeal, the court must assume the defendant is
not under the act in the absence of stipulation or evidence
to the contrary. The opinion further stated that the words
"bound by the act," as used in Section 29, mean "subject
to its terms" and are to be applied only to employers. The
appellate court decision was foreshadowed by Botthof
v. Fenske76 in which case the appellate court had discussed
69 310 Ill. App. 486 at 490, 34 N.E. (2d) 721 at 722.
70 310 IMl. App. 101, 33 N.E. (2d) 925 (1941), noted in 20 CHICACO-KENT LAw
REvxEw 16.
71 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 198 et seq.
72 378 Ill. 595, 39 N.E. (2d) 317 (1942).
73 380 Ill. 341, 43 N.E. (2d) 934 (1942).
74 IMI. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 166.
75 Thornton v. Herman, 311 Ill. App. 513, 36 N.E. (2d) 840 (1941), noted in 30 IU.
B. J. 383, 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 362.
76 280 Ill. App. 362 (1935). See also 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REviw 117.
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the theory and effect of liability or non-liability as to the
wrong-doing employee.
An appeal was thereafter allowed to the Supreme Court
and the holding of the appellate court was reversed. The
sole question presented was the plaintiff's right to maintain
her action for damages under the Injuries Act 7 7 against
an employee of an employer also under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. That court reviewed its finding in O'Brien
v. Chicago City Railway Co., 78 and found no need to add
further to, but merely to apply, the principles there an-
nounced. Answering specifically the contention of the ap-
pellate court that the statute lends itself to another construc-
tion, the Supreme Court said:
It is argued that the statute should be construed as distinguishing be-
tween being bound by the act to pay compensation and being bound by
the act in reference to right of recovery for accidental injury. If such
construction was applied, the statute in effect would read that a person
bound by the act was a person who was by the act required to pay com-
pensation. We find nothing in any of the sections of the act which will
support such a construction. 'Bound by the act' as applied to employees
means that in the right to recover damages for accidental injury the
provisions of the Compensation Act control.
79
Since the defendant was a person "bound" by the act within
the meaning of Section 29, then the right of action that plain-
tiff had against him as a negligent third party was, under
said section, transferred to the employer of the decedent, and
the measure of damage was limited to the amount of com-
pensation for which the latter became liable. The decision,
therefore, clarifies the section in question.
In Thompson v. Industrial Commission0 the Supreme
Court further defined and reiterated language it had pre-
viously used to fix the scope of the jurisdiction of the circuit
courts to review decisions of the Industrial Commission. The
commission had there held that the employer was engaged
in interstate commerce, but the circuit court, on certiorari,
held that the local act applied, and therefore ordered the
case remanded to the commission with directions to deter-
77 IlH. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 70, § 1.
78 305 i. 244, 137 N.E. 214 (1922).
79 380 Ill. 341 at 346, 43 N.E. (2d) 934 at 936.
80 377 Ill. 587, 37 N.E. (2d) 350 (1941).
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mine the liability. From this order, an appeal was taken to
the Supreme Court. That court dismissed the appeal on the
ground that the order of the circuit court, not being a final
order, was not reviewable by writ of error, since the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court was limited to that of review-
ing final judgments.
PARTNERSHIP
In those states which have adhered to the "aggregate"
rather than the "entity" theory of a partnership, the de-
cision in the case of Lewis v. West Side Trust & Savings
Bank8 will present nothing new. Illinois is included in this
group, but as the case presents the issues very clearly and
as the decision is clear cut, it is worthy of notice for it
disposes of an idea current among some lawyers that either
the Uniform Partnership Act, the Civil Practice Act, or the
rules of court may have modified the historical conception
of a partnership. In that case a complaint was filed against
"B. Cohen & Sons" but it contained no statement that such
defendant was a partnership, a corporation, or any other
particular type of association. The return of the sheriff on
the summons issued thereunder showed that the defendant
was served "by leaving a copy with John M. Cohen, a co-
partner in B. Cohen & Sons, a partnership." Judgment fol-
lowed by default. John M. Cohen, individually, was in fact
neither sued or summoned, nor could a valid judgment under
these circumstances be entered against him. The sheriff's
return itself was, of course, no evidence that John M. Cohen
was a partner, or that there was a partnership. The Supreme
Court said, quoting in part from an Oregon case,8 2 that:
"A partnership cannot be sued as such. The names of its
members must be set out in the complaint and in the sum-
mons. This is an old and well established rule. . ." Efforts
to change the common law rule by rule of court or by
service statutes have heretofore failed in Illinois. The com-
mon law is still in force and the Uniform Partnership Act
has changed nothing on this particular point.
81 377 Mll. 384, 36 N.E. (2d) 573 (1941), noted in 30 Ill. B. J. 336.
82 Dunham v. Shindler, 17 Ore. 256, 20 P. 326 (1889).
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II. CONTRACTS
The field of general contract law was barren of significant
decisions, but a few cases dealing with rather specialized
branches of that subject are worthy of notice.
INSURANCE
The question of coverage, and the related problem as to
which of two or more companies shall pay when the in-
sured happens to have "double," excess, or additional in-
surance and where no fraud or over-reaching is involved,
has troubled the courts from time to time. Insurance com-
panies have been brought into collision with one another over
this point as each company is anxious to have the other
pay the greater part or all of the loss. One such situation
was recently before the court in Zurich General Accident
& Liability Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Clamor.' Accord-
ing to the facts therein, B struck and injured a third person
while driving A's car with the latter's permission. Both B
and A were insured. A's policy was applicable for the rea-
son that the insurance carrier had extended coverage to
any person using the automobile with A's permission. B's
policy bore an endorsement, dated later than A's policy,
which protected B while driving the car of another person
with permission, but which limited the coverage to "excess
insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance."
A declaratory judgment rendered by the lower court held
A's insurer subject to liability for the full amount of its
policy even though the policy contained a provision that it
should not apply to any person "with respect to any loss
against which he has other valid and collectible insurance."
On appeal, the court treated A's insurance company as
being primarily liable, with B's carrier liable only for the
"excess." It further held that B's policy was not "other"
insurance within the meaning of the quoted clause. It
seems only fair that when two companies have underwrit-
ten the same risk but from two different approaches that
neither should be allowed to set up the "other" insurance as
1 124 F. (2d) 717 (1942), affirming 36 F. Supp. 954 (1941), noted in 55 Harv. L.
Rev. 1218.
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excluding its own liability. The application given to the term
"excess insurance" can be justified if it be construed to
cover the risk of inadequate protection, that is inadequate
in amount or nature of coverage, in the primary carrier.
The court also suggested that pro-rating the loss would be
equitable in cases where the driver is only seeking sufficient
protection and where the two or more policies concerned
contain identical coverage clauses.2
In People ex rel. Palmer v. Peoria Life Insurance Com-
pany,' the Supreme Court held that where an insurance
company is liquidated and the receiver, under order of
court, enters into a re-insurance agreement with another
company so as to continue in force all existing policies whose
holders assent thereto, the agents of the liquidated company
are not entitled to commissions on renewal premiums re-
ceived whether received after appointment of the receiver
or after the date of the re-insurance agreement. In that
case, the plaintiffs were former agents of the Peoria Life
Insurance Company holding contracts calling for commis-
sions on renewal premiums. Such premiums were not, in
fact, "net" premiums but contained a loading charge from
which to pay such renewal commissions. Upon insolvency of
the company, its receiver made an agreement with the Alli-
ance Life Insurance Company to "re-insure" the assenting
policy-holders, but such contract expressly stipulated that
the re-insurer should not be liable upon the agency contracts
of the insolvent company. Certain assenting policy-holders
paid premiums to the receiver and thereafter later con-
tinued to pay the re-insurer. Plaintiffs brought suit for com-
missions allegedly due on such payments. Judgment for the
defendants in the trial court was affirmed on appeal to the
Supreme Court, since the latter could find no legal basis
under which the agents could recover. The liquidation pro-
ceedings were regarded as terminating all agency contracts.
If the insolvency of the company discharged or. terminated
its policies, it would be hard to find a legal basis for
2 On this point see note in 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1218.
8 376 Ill. 517, 34 N.E. (2d) 829, 136 A.L.R. 151 (1941), noted in 30 Ill. B. J. 251
and 26 Minn. L. Rev. 562. Gunn, Ch. J., and Wilson, J., dissented.
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a recovery from the insolvent company4 of commissions on
renewal premiums paid either to the receiver during liquida-
tion proceedings or to the new company5 for the purpose of
securing re-insurance. On the other hand, there seems to
be little doubt that, from an equitable viewpoint, inasmuch
as the insolvent company had received the loading charge
through premiums paid to it, then it might be said to hold
the same in trust for the benefit of the agents who had se-
cured the contracts and whose efforts had created the addi-
tional assets intended eventually to be paid to such agents as
"renewal" commissions.6 Two judges dissented, therefore,
relying on General American Life Insurance Company v.
Roach7 as authority.
It seems rather unusual that, until the current year, the
appellate courts of this state should not have been confront-
ed with the question of the assignability of a fire insurance
policy to which has been attached the standard mortgage
clause. That question was, however, involved in Reinhardt
v. Security Insurance Company,8 in which case a standard
fire policy had been issued with a standard mortgage clause
which made the insurance payable to a named trustee as
his interest might appear ". . and not to be invalidated
by any act or neglect of the mortgagor." This policy was in
the hands of the trustee as additional security for a note
and mortgage executed by the insured. Sometime thereafter
the trustee assigned the note, mortgage and policy to another
trustee without the knowledge of the insurer. Not until a
fire occurred did the company learn of the change of trus-
tees by assignment. The second trustee, after notice to the
company, brought suit on the policy. Several defenses were
set up by the insurer which need not be mentioned, but
among them was that of the inability of the second trus-
tee to show "privity" to the contract or to maintain suit
upon it inasmuch as the company had not been notified nor
had recognized the assignment. In reviewing the cases, the
4 Martin Emerich Outfitting Co. v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 237 Ill. 610, 86 N.E. 1104
(1909).
5 Vial v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society, 257 i. 355, 100 N.E. 929 (1913).
6 For discussion of this point see note in 26 Minn. L. Rev. 562.
7 179 Okl. 301, 65 P. (2d) 458 (1937).
8 312 Ill. App. 1, 38 N.E. (2d) 310 (1941).
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appellate court found authority outside of Illinois justifying
the reversal of a judgment in favor of the defendant, but
could find no Illinois case in point. The court held that,
since there was no provision in the policy or in the mortgage
clause preventing any such assignment nor was there any
statutory prohibition, therefore the second trustee received
by the transfer all the rights of the first trustee. The holding
seems eminently sound under the facts.
SALES
The court was asked, in Zenith Radio Distributing Cor-
poration v. Mateer,9 to interpret the meaning of the words
"the major part" as used in the Illinois Bulk Sales Act"0
when applied to the sale of an interest in an established
business. Though the question had never before been pre-
sented, the court came to the conclusion that the words neces-
sarily meant something greater or larger than fifty per cent.
It, therefore, held that a sale of exactly fifty per cent. of a
business was not a sale within the contemplation of that
statute.
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
As is usually the case, much of the work of the courts
of review during the current period has been concerned with
procedural questions. Cases which do not involve some is-
sue of practice or procedure are rare, yet many of the
questions presented may be dismissed as being trite from
long application of the principle of stare decisis. Those cases
which present some novelty in procedural law are here sum-
marized and presented in roughly the same order as would
be followed by a lawyer presenting his client's case.
REMEDIES AT LAW
By reason of the years of their existence, the jurisdiction
of the various Illinois courts has come to be a fairly well
understood matter. Of considerable importance, therefore,
is the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Werner v.
9 311 IIl. App. 263, 35 N.E. (2d) 815 (1941), noted in 30 Ill. B. J. 298.
10 I1. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 121 , § 78.
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Illinois Central Railroad Company1 which has resulted in a
surprising reversal of former opinions held regarding the
civil jurisdiction of the various city courts throughout the
state. The act defining that jurisdiction states that such city
courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit
court within the city in which the same may be "in all civil
cases both law and chancery and in all criminal cases arising
in said city. . "I The words "arising in said city" have
been understood to limit the city courts in their power to
pass on criminal cases, but it was the belief that such limi-
tation did not apply to civil transitory causes of action, pro-
vided the defendant could be found within the city.' The Su-
preme Court has, however, now indicated that the phrase
"arising in said city" applies to all proceedings, both civil
and criminal, so that the jurisdiction of such courts must,
hereafter, be deemed limited to matters occurring within
the city area. Use of such courts for other types of cases,
such as divorce proceedings," should be given serious con-
sideration.
The ancient common law writ of quo warranto and the
information in the nature of quo warranto were utilized to
secure not only the ouster of the usurper of public office or
public functions but also to insure his punishment as a crim-
inal.' They were not available to procure redress for private
wrongs nor could they be utilized at the suit of the private
litigant. Their modern statutory counterpart is essentially
a civil proceeding,6 but its use by the private litigant is
restricted to situations where the interest is personal and
then only after application has first been made for action
by the proper public official. Moreover, leave must first be
obtained from the court to institute the proceeding.7 These
factors lead the Illinois Supreme Court to decide, in Rowan
1 379 Ili. 559, 42 N.E. (2d) 82 (1942), reversing 309 Ill. App. 292, 33 N.E. (2d)
121 (1941), noted post in this issue.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 37, § 333.
3 See, for example, McGlynn & McGlynn v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 313 Ill. App.
396, 40 N.E. (2d) 539 (1942).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 40, § 6. See also 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 17.
5 3 Black. Comm. 263.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 112, § 9 et seq. Section 15 specifically provides that the
Civil Practice Act shall apply to quo warranto proceedings.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 112, § 10.
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v. City of Shawneetown,8 that the private property owner is
not entitled to use this writ when his property rights are
damaged if the same type of damage is being inflicted on
other property owners in the same area, for the wrong is
then a "public" one and not "personal and peculiar" to
himself. In so holding, the court appears to have nullified
language in the present statute which was not in the earlier
act9 and which was probably inserted to clarify the effect
of the decision in People ex rel. Miller v. Fullenwider.1°
It is rather difficult to see how the private property owner
in the instant case failed to measure up to the present stat-
utory requirement of "having an interest in the question on
his own relation,"" and the introduction of a further re-
quirement that it be "peculiar" to himself seems unwar-
ranted.
Two of the appellate courts of the state have come to
opposite conclusions on the right of a blind person to assign
a claim for benefits under the statute for the relief of the
blind"2 so as to permit suit thereon by the assignee."3 In
one case14 recovery was allowed to the representative of
the deceased blind person's estate on the ground that the
claim for benefits, once determined as being due the blind
person, was a debt and not a mere expectancy, hence could
be enforced by suit during lifetime,15 or collected by the
legal representative after death under an assignment by
operation of law.' In the other, 17 despite the fact that the
pension was admittedly due, it was held that the failure
8 378 1ll. 289, 38 N.E. (2d) 2 (1941).
9 Smith Hurd Anno. Stat., Ch. 112, § 1, permitted the Attorney General, either
of his own accord, or "at the instance of any individual relator," to present a
petition for leave to file the necessary information.
10 329 Ill. 65, 160 N.E. 175 (1928), which holds that a tax-payer, as such, has not
sufficient interest.
11 MI1. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 112, § 10.
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 23, § 279 et seq.
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 146.
14 People ex rel. Powles v. Alexander County, 310 Ill. App. 602, 35 N.E. (2d)
92 (1941).
15 Proffitt v. Christian County, 370 Ill. 530, 19 N.E. (2d) 345 (1939).
16 The action by the administrator must, according to People ex rel. Powles v.
Alexander County, 310 Ill. App. 602, 35 N.E. (2d) 92 (1941), be brought within five
years or be barred by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 83, § 16.
17 People ex rel. Rude v. LaSalle County, 310 Ill. App. 541, 34 N.E. (2d) 865
(1941). The action of the Appellate Court in refusing the writ of mandamus was
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of the pensioner to collect during his lifetime precluded
action by his administrator, since, absent any statute per-
mitting a survival of action, the claim abated on his death. 8
Clarification of the issue by the Supreme Court is desirable.
REMEDIES IN EQUITY
The interest of bar associations in preventing the unau-
thorized practice of law has again been recognized by the
Illinois courts as entitled to equitable protection. In Chi-
cago Bar Association v. United Taxpayers of America19
the appellate court held that a certified public accountant
who solicited authority from various persons to represent
them in the preparation and presentation of claims to the
Department of Finance for refunds of taxes paid under the
Illinois Retailers Occupation Tax Act2" was practicing law.
In reaching this conclusion the court relied primarily on the
Goodman case,2' involving the conduct of a person not a
lawyer in presenting workmen's compensation claims before
the Industrial Commission. The defendant in the instant case
attempted to justify his activities by virtue of the provisions
of Rule 1 of the Department of Finance, which provided that
certified public accountants might be designated by taxpay-
ers to represent them in matters before the department. The
court relied upon the well-established doctrine in Illinois that
the regulation of the practice of law is the province of the
courts. The doctrine of the separation of powers prevents
even the legislature from authorizing a layman to practice
law.22 The court indicated that the rule of the Department
of Finance was void.
affirmed by the Supreme Court, in 378 Ill. 578, 39 N.E. (2d) 25 (1942), on the
ground that the action was premature since the claim sought to be enforced had
not yet been made conclusive by any judgment. A stipulation by the parties that
mandamus was the proper remedy was rejected. The court refused to pass on
the cardinal problem of whether or not the pension claim inured to the legal
representatives of the blind pensioner, hence neither approved or disapproved the
language of the Appellate Court on that point.
18 Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928).
19 312 IlM. App. 243, 38 N.E. (2d) 349 (1942).
20 i. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 120, § 440-53.
21 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E. (2d)
941 (1937).
22 In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899).
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In the case of Fletcher v. City of Paris,23 the Supreme
Court considered the problem of whether a court of equity
should restrain the holding of a municipal election on the
ground that the ordinance pursuant to which the election
was to be held was void. The city council had passed an
ordinance for the construction of a municipal power plant
and provided for the submission of the question to a refer-
endum vote as required by the municipal ownership act.24
Plaintiffs, as citizens, voters, property owners, and taypay-
ers, filed suit to enjoin the holding of the election and to
restrain the paying out of any money by the city for the ex-
penses thereof. The trial court dismissed the complaint for
want of equity and the Supreme Court affirmed this ruling.
Several reasons were given by the court why equity should
not interfere. It was said to be a settled rule in Illinois that
the courts will not enjoin the holding of an election. A policy
against interference with orderly governmental processes
lies back of this rule. The court pointed out that the election
here was a step in the legislative process authorized by the
municipal ownership act and that equity would not inter-
fere with the passage of invalid laws, but only with their en-
forcement. The lack of any immediately threatened injury
and the remote interest of taxpayers in the trifling expendi-
tures arising out of elections were also assigned as reasons.
The election had already been held when the Supreme Court
considered the case and jurisdiction was retained only be-
cause of the prayer to restrain expenditures. It should be
noted that the opinion does not contain language indicating
that equity is without power to act in cases involving political
questions such as characterized some of the earlier cases
dealing with similar problems.25
The case of Simpson v. Adkins26 is of passing interest on
the question of when it is proper for a court of equity to ap-
point a receiver in litigation involving the determination of
conflicting interests in land. It was stressed in the opinion
23 377 Ill. 89, 35 N.E. (2d) 329 (1941).
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 111-2/3, § 96-8, repealed as of January 1, 1942.
25 See, for example, Dickey v. Reed, 78 Il. 261 (1875), and compare with the
opinion in the recent case of Daly v. Madison County, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E. (2d)
160 (1941).
26 311 Ila. App. 543, 37 N.E. (2d) 355 (1941).
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that only circumstances of extreme emergency will justify
the appointment of a receiver without notice to the adverse
parties.
The use of the class or representative suit has been sanc-
tioned whenever it appears that the parties are so numer-
ous that it is inconvenient to bring them all before the court
provided it appear that "they all stand in the same situation,
and have one common right or one common interest, the
operation and protection of which will be for the common
benefit of all, and can not be to the injury of any. ' 27 The re-
quirement of a "common right" or a "common interest"
is not the same thing as the "common question of law" which
permits the joinder of distinct claims by separate plaintiffs
in the one action, 28 hence one attempting to use the repre-
sentative form of action gets no assistance from the provi-
sions of the Civil Practice Act, and must justify his right to
proceed on the fundamental rule stated above. The "common
right" was found to exist in one case during the period under
consideration and was denied in another. In the former,
Flanagan v. City of Chicago,2 one of some five hundred
property owners was allowed to maintain a representative
suit to compel a city to make a refund of a surplus arising
from a special assessment proceeding even though the pro-
portionate shares of the individual owners in such surplus
were varied in amount. In the other, Peoples Store of Rose-
land v. McKibbin,80 a single store proprietor, claiming to
act on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, was
denied the right to compel the distribution of a fund accu-
mulated from alleged improper collections of the Retailer's
Occupational Tax on the ground that the same did not consti-
tute a common fund in which the several taxpayers had a
common interest. The distinction seems to lie in treating the
special assessment fund as a trust fund in which all con-
27 Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227 at 257, 33 N.E. 858 at 867 (1893).
28 IMI. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 147.
29 311 Ill. App. 135, 35 N.E. (2d) 545 (1941). The claim that the court having
jurisdiction of the special assessment proceeding should have exclusive jurisdiction
over refunds, since the final certificate of cost and completion required by Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 790 must be filed therein, was rejected on the ground that such
court had no power to compel a refund.
30 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E. (2d) 995 (1942).
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tributors participate as beneficiaries, 81 while regarding the
sales tax fund as a pool made up of individual contributions
resulting from many separate and distinct transactions. 2
Further emphasis for the doctrine that litigants may not
"disturb the courts and vex the parties with many actions""
was provided by the decision in Skolnik v. Petella,3 4 as a
consequence of which the attorney, preparing a complaint
in a foreclosure proceeding, should be certain to include
sufficient allegations to support a deficiency decree not on-
ly against the makers but also against any assuming grantee
of the mortgaged premises. A separate suit for the purpose
of enforcing liability on the assumption contract after the
grantee has been named as defendant in the foreclosure pro-
ceedings will be defeated by the defense of res adjudicata.
The historical differences between law actions and pro-
ceedings in equity were not eliminated by Section 31 of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act'3 so the pleader should not fail
to distinguish between the several possible theories support-
ing each. If, by mistake, one form is chosen when the other
would have been proper, the act provides that the trial court
may transfer the cause from the law docket to the equity
side, or vice versa." According to Barger v. First National
Bank of Danville," however, this power is not conferred on
the court to exercise against the wishes of the plaintiff, so
if the latter does not request the transfer or even protests
against it being made, the court can only dismiss the pro-
ceedings erroneously instituted on the wrong theory.
PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS
By statute effective January 1, 1942, certain changes have
been made in the Illinois Civil Practice Act. Thus the sec-
81 The proceeds of special assessments, when collected, are undoubtedly trust
funds at least so far as the rights of holders of special assessment bonds are con-
cerned: Conway v. City of Chicago, 237 Ill. 128, 86 N.E. 619 (1908); Rothschild v.
Village of Calumet Park, 350 Ill. 330, 183 N.E. 337 (1932).
32 Thorn v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 206 Minn. 589, 289 N.W. 516 (1940).
33 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Mayo, 170 Ill. 498 at 502, 48 N.E. 917 at 919 (1897).
34 376 Ill. 500, 34 N.E. (2d) 825 (1941), affirming 304 Ill. App. 331, 26 N.E. (2d)
646 (1940). Gunn, Ch. J., Farthing, J., and Wilson, J., dissented without opinion.
35 I. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 155.
36 IMl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 168(2).
87 310 Ill. App. 628, 35 N.E. (2d) 556 (1941), noted in 20 CHICAWO-KENT LAw
REvisw 97.
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tion dealing with venue has been enlarged so as to fix
the same with regard to suits against quasi-municipal cor-
porations.38 That provision dealing with service outside the
county has now been changed so as to deny the service
officer the right to have the additional mileage taxed as
costs, and, in lieu thereof, permits the return of the writ
to be made by mail. 9
The pleader preparing a complaint in a tort action for
personal injuries against a municipal corporation must be
sure to see that notice of the injury has been served on
the corporate defendant as required by statute" and should
make suitable allegation of that fact in the complaint.4'
Inasmuch as the requirement of notice is mandatory,42 it
will not suffice, according to McCarthy v. City of Chicago,4 3
to allege that the city in fact knew of the claim, as by the
submission thereof to the city council for approval and pay-
ment, unless written notice was also duly served on the
officials enumerated in the statute. The fact that the written
claim presented to the city council necessarily passed
through the hands of any such official was not regarded as
sufficient to comply with statutory requirements.
When preparing a complaint for the foreclosure of a
mortgage, though, the attorney may apparently fix the
limits of the controversy, according to Korngabiel v. Fish,"
as broadly or narrowly as he pleases. He may, since a com-
mon subject matter is involved, litigate therein all questions
affecting the title, 5 or, following the older view,48 may con-
fine the case to issues growing out of the mortgage itself. If
38 Laws 1941, II, 464, § 8(3); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 132(3).
39 Laws 1941, II, 465, § 10(1); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 134(1). See also
Amended Rule 4(2) of the Supreme Court, 378 Ill. 10.
40 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 1-11 and Ch. 70, § 7.
41 Prior to the enactment of the Civil Practice Act, an omission of this alle-
gation was fatal and could not be cured, even though notice in fact had been given,
if the attempted amendment came after the period of limitation had run: Walters
v. City of Ottawa, 240 Il. 259, 88 N.E. 651 (1909). For the present rule see Schafer
v. City of Edwardsville, 309 Ill. App. 437, 32 N.E. (2d) 979 (1941), abst. opin.
42 Erford v. City of Peoria, 229 Ill. 546, 82 N.E. 374 (1907).
43 312 Ill. App. 268, 38 N.E. (2d) 519 (1941).
44 313 Ill. App. 286, 40 N.E. (2d) 314 (1942), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVw 354.
45 Kronan Building & Loan Association v. Medeck, 368 Ill. 118, 13 N.E. (2d) 66
(1938), noted in 16 CHIcACo-KiN REvTmw 279.
46 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Hoge, 359 Ill. 36, 193 N.E. 660 (1934).
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he chooses the latter, other persons may not force an expan-
sion of the proceedings by the process of intervention 47 unless
the court, in its discretion, should permit the same.
The purpose of Section 43 of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act 4 was obviously that of making it possible for the plaintiff
who had an honest doubt as to the exact basis for his claim,
but knew that one of several possible theories could support
it, to state the same in alternative fashion. When he avails
himself of this method, the defendant may not, according to
Wattman v. St. Luke's Hospital Association,9 compel an elec-
tion between the several alternatives prior to the close of the
evidence. If defendant should feel in any way aggrieved by
such alternative joinder, especially if the several theories are
inconsistent," his only remedy is to move, pursuant to Sec-
tion 44 (1) of the act,5' for separate trials upon the several
counts. The motion to compel an election is not the same as
a motion for severance.
Under the former practice exhibits attached to a plead-
ing in a law action were of no consequence, 2 and, if at-
tached to pleadings in equitable proceedings, were cog-
nizable only if incorporated therein by apt reference. 53
The Civil Practice Act changed this by requiring that all
pertinent documents or exhibits should be attached, and fur-
ther provided that, when so attached, the same should "con-
stitute a part of the pleading for all purposes. ' 54 Signifi-
cance was given to this last phrase by the decision in Pure
47 Lake View Trust and Savings Bank v. Rice, 279 Ill. App. 538 (1935).
48 fll. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 167(2).
49 314 Ill. App. 244, 41 N.E. (2d) 314 (1942).
50 In the case under consideration, a suit for malpractice, plaintiff alleged in
the first count that defendant's carelessness had caused the death of her husband
and therefore sought recovery under the Injuries Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 70,
§ 1. In the second count, plaintiff alleged, in the alternative, that the defendant
doctor had breached a contract with his patient to treat the latter skilfully, thereby
causing injury, but that such breach was not the proximate cause of death. An
argument over whether this latter cause of action survived, since no suit had been
brought thereon by decedent in his lifetime, was decided by interpreting Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 494, to cover not only "actions" but also "causes of action"
under the authority of Genslinger v. New Illinois Athletic Club, 229 Ill. App. 428
(1923).
5' II. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 168(1).
52 Riley v. Yost, 58 W. Va. 213, 52 S.E. 40, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 777 (1905).
53 Rubin v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 249 Ill. App. 486 (1928).
54 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 160.
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Oil Co. v. Miller-McFarland Drilling Co., 55 which holds that
the contents of such exhibits must be regarded as so many
additional allegations in the pleading to which they are at-
tached so as to require the opposing counsel to controvert
the same or be regarded as admitting the truth thereof. 6
When attached to an answer, the exhibits may, there-
fore, operate as an affirmative defense requiring the plain-
tiff to take issue therewith by a reply.57
The Illinois Civil Practice Act also requires that the
defendant shall specifically set forth in his answer any de-
fense which, if not so stated, "would be likely to take the
opposite party by surprise," and, by way of illustration,
enumerates among others the defense of payment." When
so pleaded, a question is likely to arise as to whether or
not the burden of proof on the issue has thereby been cast
upon the defendant. Litigants have, apparently, been acting
on the assumption that such was the necessary result of so
pleading, but a caveat has been expressed, in the concur-
ring opinion in First National Bank & Trust Company of
Evanston v. Simon,59 to the effect that the duty to prove
non-payment in suits on money contracts is still with the
plaintiff though the issue must be introduced by the defend-
ant's answer.
It is not unusual for an attorney to stipulate with oppo-
nent's counsel for an enlargement of the time within which
some step in the litigation should be taken. Such profes-
sional courtesy, if not violative of any right of the client, is
to be commended. Care should, however, be observed in
drafting any such stipulation to prevent any question aris-
ing as to the scope thereof. Thus, in Woods v. First National
Bank of Chicago,6 ° plaintiff's counsel agreed that defendant
might have an additional ten days in which to file "a sworn
answer" to the complaint. On the tenth day the defendant's
attorney filed a motion to strike the complaint for failure to
55 376 Il. 486, 34 N.E. (2d) 854 (1941).
56 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 164(2).
57 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 156.
58 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 167(4).
59 312 Il. App. 214, 38 N.E. (2d) 360 (1941), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvi1w 171.
60 314 Ill. App. 340, 41 N.E. (2d) 235 (1942).
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state a cause of action. Plaintiff contended that, in view of
the limited nature of the stipulation, defendant was in default
for failure to answer."1 Despite this the trial court refused
to enter the default order, but instead sustained defendant's
motion and entered judgment dismissing the suit. On appeal
such action was affirmed, the court being of the opinion
that the enforcement of a stipulation is within the discretion
of the court and that the word "answer" was broad enough
to cover a motion to strike.62
In Book v. Ewbank3 a judgment had been taken against
a non-resident defendant by virtue of a confession clause in
a note which authorized any attorney to appear in any court
and confess judgment. When garnishment proceedings ap-
peared likely to result in collection, the judgment debtor
moved for leave to open up the judgment and plead to the
merits. He later contended that the court lacked jurisdiction
of his person inasmuch as the authority to confess judgment
had become functus officio by the passage of time.6 4 It was
held, however, that the defendant, by his conduct in asking
leave to plead, had, in effect, entered a general appearance
and had thereby conferred jurisdiction on the trial court.
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE
Summary judgment proceedings have now been extended,
by statute, to counterclaims and equitable proceedings, in
certain enumerated classes, as well as to original suits and
may, therefore, be now utilized by defendants as well as
plaintiffs;65 pre-trial discovery may now include compul-
sory answers to written interrogatories;66 and, subject to
rules, pre-trial conferences may be compelled.67
The trial and disposition of cases hereafter must also be
handled in the light of certain revisions now effective. Thus
61 111. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.8(1).
62 Steele v. Moss, 69 Wis. 496, 34 N.W. 237, 2 Am. St. Rep. 756 (1887).
63 311 Il. App. 312, 35 N.E. (2d) 961 (1941), noted in 30 IlM. B. J. 213.
64 Matzenbaugh v. Doyle, 156 Ill. 331, 40 N.E. 935 (1895).
65 Laws 1941, II, 465, § 57; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 181. See also Amended
Rules 15 and 16 of the Supreme Court, 378 Ill. 10-2.
66 Laws 1941, II, 466, § 58; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 182.
67 Laws 1941, II, 466, § 58%; IMl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 182a. See also added
Rule 23A of the Supreme Court, 378 Ill. 12.
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trial by jury in a law action should be demanded at time of
suit or upon filing of appearance, but, if the proceedings be
of an equitable nature, such demand would be improper. If,
however, an equitable action should be later transferred to
the law docket, the plaintiff is now allowed three days after
such order of transfer to present his demand for jury trial;
the defendant is granted six days in which so to do. Failure
to act in the allotted time amounts to a waiver of trial by
jury.8 The objection to the decision in Westerfield v. Red-
mert is thereby obviated.
The propriety of establishing a prospective juror's con-
nection with an insurance company on voir dire examina-
tion was again under consideration in Kavanaugh v. Par-
ret ° which case held that the plaintiff's affidavit to show
good faith permitting such interrogation7' could be over-
come by defendant's counter-affidavit showing lack of ne-
cessity for such line of questioning.
A provision has also been added under which the defendant
in an equitable proceeding may, at the close of the plain-
tiff's case, move for a finding in his favor or to dismiss for
want of equity. Such motion constitutes a submission of the
case on the merits, but, if it results in an adverse ruling, the
defendant may still offer proof of his defense. 72
The nature of the proof which may be offered at the trial
of a case is fairly well understood. One case, however, war-
rants consideration. In Kanne v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company,7 the plaintiff sued to recover upon a double in-
demnity clause contained in a life and accident policy. The
death of the insured occurred in a lake in California where
the body was found floating in the water. A doctor who had
examined the body was permitted to testify at the trial to
the effect that the death could or might have been due to
an illness. His opinion was not based on any facts in the evi-
68 Laws 1941, II, 466, § 64(1); 111. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 188(1).
69 310 Ill. App. 246, 33 N.E. (2d) 744 (1941), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEw 59.
70 379 Ill. 273, 40 N.E. (2d) 500 (1942), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 371.
71 Smithers v. Henriquez, 368 Ill. 588, 15 N.E. (2d) 499 (1938).' See also note in
16 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEw 371.
72 Laws 1941, II, 466, § 64(4); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 188(4).
78 310 Ill. App. 524, 34 N.E. (2d) 732 (1941), noted in 17 Ind. L. J. 440.
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dence. The jury gave credence to his testimony and brought
in a verdict for the defendant. The trial judge, notwith-
standing the verdict, rendered judgment on the policy in
favor of the plaintiff. The appellate court, in affirming the
judgment, indicated that, under the pertinent statute,74 such
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict reaches the
question of whether or not there is any evidence which may
be considered by the jury, and is properly used where, as
here, there is no evidence to sustain the defendant's con-
tention. The physician's testimony was a pure guess unsup-
ported by any facts in the record. The plaintiff, therefore,
having proved the fact of death and the attendant circum-
stances, could well rest his case upon the presumption
against suicide. The decision seems entirely correct whether
considered as a question of evidence or dealt with as a ques-
tion involving the burden of proof. It should be further noted
that a death certificate introduced into evidence was merely
evidence of the fact of death, and could not be used as proof
of the cause of death since the causes recited therein were
mere conclusions on the part of the issuing officer.
A statute now provides that the instructions given to the
jury are to be taken by them to the jury room and are to be
returned with the verdict and then filed as a part of the pro-
ceedings.75
DAMAGES
The vexing question as to whether or not an allowance
for attorney's fees may be made as damages when the de-
fendant's tortious conduct has required plaintiff to expend
money for that purpose in conducting antecedent litigation
was again before the court in Ritter v. Ritter.76 It there ap-
peared that the defendant had wrongfully acquired and re-
tained title to certain lands properly belonging to plaintiff.
74 I1. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 192(3a).
75 Laws 1941, II, 466, § 67(2); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 191(2).
76 313 Ill. App. 407, 40 N.E. (2d) 565 (1942), in which Dady, J., dissented. An
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court has been allowed. In an earlier appeal on the
pleadings in the same case, Ritter v. Ritter, 308 IMl. App. 337, 32 N.E. (2d) 185
(1940), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 83, the complaint had been sustained
against objection that it failed to state a cause of action and the further objection
of res adjudicata.
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A prior suit in equity between the same parties had lead to
a decree compelling a conveyance of the premises, but no
claim for attorney's fees was advanced or allowed in that
proceeding. Thereafter, plaintiff brought the instant case as
a suit at law in tort to recover the fees paid in conducting
the prior suit.7 7 It was admitted that had the expense been
incurred in securing a return of the property from some
third person the claim would have been proper. 78 The de-
fendant contended, however, that the failure to assert the
demand in the equity proceeding had resulted in the decree
therein becoming res adjudicata. The majority viewed the
claim as being one separate from the original demand, since
predicated on defendant's malicious tort in refusing to rec-
ognize his obligations as constructive trustee, consequently,
though it might have been urged in the chancery proceed-
ing,79 the decree therein did not preclude this suit. The dis-
senting opinion, which seems the sounder view, regarded
the problem as no different than the ordinary case in which
plaintiff is obliged to sue to assert his rights under which,
absent any statute, the public policy has been to make each
party bear his own expense. 80 Even though it were different,
plaintiff had been given his opportunity in the chancery pro-
ceeding hence should not be allowed to relitigate the issue.8'
If the decision should be permitted to stand, it could become
77 For a comparable problem see Marvin v. Prentice, 94 N.Y. 295 (1884), in
which grantor was obliged to sue in equity to establish the fact that a deed absolute
in form was really a mortgage, and was successful therein. In a new suit to
recover the expense and counsel fee incurred in the first proceeding, held: recov-
ery denied. See also Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542 (1932).
78 See McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Damages, (West Publishing Co.,
St. Paul, Minn., 1935) 246-53.
79 The fundamental doctrine that if equity takes jurisdiction at all, it will retain
it for all purposes, legal or equitable, connected with the principal controversy,
would apply: Martin v. Strubel, 367 Ill. 21, 10 N.E. (2d) 325 (1937).
80 Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619, 51 N.E. 569 (1898).
81 The majority sought to distinguish the instant case from Skolnik v. Petella.
376 Ill. 500, 34 N.E. (2d) 825 (1941), in which a suit to foreclose a mortgage had
named both the makers and the assuming grantees as defendants. After deficiency
judgment had been granted against the makers, a separate attempt was made to
recover on the assumption contract but was denied on the ground of res adjudi-
cata. In claiming that only one cause of action was there asserted, in contrast
with the alleged two grounds of recovery in the instant case, the majority have
overlooked the fact that the assumption contract is, itself, independently the basis
of action, and actionable in law, if the beneficiary thereof chooses to avail himself
of that form of remedy rather than through the equitable process of foreclosure.
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the basis for an expansion in the field of tort law creating a
new tort arising from the malicious defense of litigation com-
parable to the present claims based upon malicious prosecu-
tion and malicious abuse of process.
The fine print on the back of a telegraph money-order
blank stated: "In any event, the company shall not be liable
for damages . . . beyond the sum of $500, at which amount
the right to have this money order promptly and correctly
transmitted . . . is hereby valued. . . . " Such language
was held, in Siegel v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,82 to
constitute a mere limitation on liability and not to be a pro-
vision for liquidated damages. As a consequence, the plain-
tiff, who had wired a sum of money to be bet on a horse race,
but receipt of which had been delayed until after the race
had been run, was denied the right to recover the maximum
sum above stated and was limited to an allowance merely
for interest during the period of withholding. The actual loss
sustained exceeded the maximum sum, but plaintiff's failure
to prove notice to the company of any special circumstance
likely to produce unusual damage 3 required the court to
apply the ordinary rule of damage in cases involving non-
payment of money. s4 Though the point is not new, 5 it is in-
teresting to note that the United States Supreme Court was
considering the same problem at about the time of the deci-
sion in the instant case and arrived at the same conclusion. 8
Whenever defendant's tortious conduct has been motivated
by malice or premeditation, the Illinois courts have permit-
ted the jury to assess punitive or vindictive damages. 7 It
would seem, from the case of Karpluk v. Daniszewicz, 8 that
the defense that the actionable assault was an unpremedi-
82 312 IMI. App. 86, 37 N.E. (2d) 868 (1941).
83 The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), was
held applicable to telegraph cases in Lust v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 243
Ill. App. 624 (1926). This case was not reported in full, but the substance of the
holding is, however, set forth in the instant case.
84 5 Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed., § 1410.
85 Wernick v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 290 Ill. App. 569, 9 N.E. (2d) 72
(1937), had held the language in question to be a limitation on liability and not
an agreement for liquidated damages.
86 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Nester, 309 U.S. 582, 60 S. Ct. 769, 84 L. Ed.
960, 128 A.L.R. 628 (1940), reversing 106 F. (2d) 587 (1939).
87 Drohn v. Brewer, 77 Ill. 280 (1875); Shea v. Cassidy, 257 II. App. 557 (1930).
88 312 Ill. App. 597, 38 N.E. (2d) 823 (1942), noted in 26 Marq. L. Rev. 212 (1942).
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tated "flare-up" will not be availing if the jury can say
there was no provocation present, hence an award of puni-
tive damages would be proper. According to the facts of that
case, plaintiff, a woman, was standing on a public sidewalk
next to defendant's tavern engaged in conversation with a
male companion. She was holding a dog attached by a leash.
Defendant, without provocation, seized the dog's tail, whirled
it around in the air, and then dropped it. The male com-
panion was knocked down by defendant when he remon-
strated, and when plaintiff also protested she too was
knocked down. A verdict that such conduct was wilful, wan-
ton and malicious, carrying with it an allowance of $2,250.00
for damages, was sustained on the ground that the assault
need not be premeditated to warrant such allowance.
APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Persons seeking to appeal from a decision of the trial
court are required, by Section 74 of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act,"9 to present a notice of appeal within the time per-
mitted by law. The form of such notice is prescribed by
Rule 33 of the Illinois Supreme Court ° which further re-
quires that the same shall be signed "by or on behalf of
the party or parties joining in the notice of appeal." A com-
mon-sense application was given to this rule, in Logemeyer
v. Fulton State Bank,9 where it was held that a notice of
appeal signed by "Henry Logemeyer, et al., plaintiffs" was
sufficient to indicate that the appeal was taken on behalf
of all 137 plaintiffs who had joined in the original proceeding.
The contention that each one should have either signed the
notice or else filed a separate notice of appeal was rejected
as imposing a useless burden on court and litigants with
benefit to nobody, and utterly opposed to the spirit of the
act.92
That the rules of court are to have the force of law on
persons using the judicial processes is axiomatic. Persons
who will not comply with such rules should, justifiably, be
89 IU. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 198.
90 IIl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.33.
91 313 Ill. App. 270, 40 N.E. (2d) 316 (1942).
92 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 128.
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denied the assistance of the courts. Yet the application of
this principle may work some unusual results. Thus,
in Knecht v. Sincox,3 a petition for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court was dismissed for failure to comply with
Rule 32 of that court94 because such petition failed to set
forth the essentials required thereby. On the other hand,
the appellant in Swain v. Hoberg,95 whose brief contained
all the essential data, though arranged in a different fashion
than dictated by the court rules, 96 was likewise denied a
review of his case even though his opponent had made no
motion to dismiss the appeal.97 While the first ruling may
be justified, the decision in the second instance seems
unduly harsh.'
The jurisdiction of the Illinois Appellate Court is limited
to reviewing final judgments in any suit or proceeding at
law or in chancery.9 It may not exercise jurisdiction except
as conferred by statute.1 It therefore seemed obvious to the
court, in City of Freeport v. Kaiser,2 that it had no jurisdic-
tion to review proceedings to revoke a liquor license since
the statute, while permitting review by "appeal" to the local
circuit court, is silent as to further procedure.' In so decid-
ing, however, the court has indirectly reflected on the pos-
sible unconstitutionality of such statute, for, if the "appeal"
to the circuit court is a mere review of the work of the
administrative body, it runs counter to the decision in City
93 376 Ill. 586, 35 N.E. (2d) 68 (1941).
94 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.32.
95 312 Ill. App. 610, 38 N.E. (2d) 966 (1942), noted in 20 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REviEw 264.
96 II. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.39.
97 A motion was made to dismiss, as well as a counter-motion for leave to
amend, but not until after the case had been submitted, hence both came too late.
The court, therefore, acted on its own motion.
98 Fortunately for the litigant in Swain v. Hoberg, the Illinois Supreme Court
granted leave to appeal and, in 380 Ill. -, 44 N.E. (2d) 38 (1942), outside the
period of this survey, reversed such decision on the ground that the purpose of
the rule was to promote justice and not to serve to entrap litigants. Gyure v. Sloan
Valve Co., 367 Ill. 489, 11 N.E. (2d) 963 (1937), was distinguished.
99 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 201(1).
1 Ward v. Mississippi River Power Co., 188 Ill. App. 305 (1914).
2 311 Ill. App. 197, 35 N.E. (2d) 722 (1941), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEw 103.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 43, § 154.
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of Aurora v. Schoeberlein,4 whereas if it be a statutory pro-
ceeding in the nature of certiorari 5 still further review of the
decision of the circuit court in the appropriate appellate tri-
bunal should be available.6
When declaring unconstitutional that portion of Section 92
of the Illinois Civil Practice Act7 which purported to confer
power on the reviewing court to receive original evidence
not offered in the trial court,' the Illinois Supreme Court
spoke solely of its own inability to receive such evidence.
The same reasoning has now been applied, and with the
same result, to the several Appellate courts under the de-
cision in Ockenga v. Alken.' In the same way, the action
taken in the Goodrich case,"° which declared Section 68(3c)
of the Illinois Civil Practice Act 1 unconstitutional as at-
tempting to confer original jurisdiction on appellate tribun-
als, foreshadowed the result in Scott v. Freeport Motor Cas-
ualty Co.' 2 The decision therein now forbids the appellate
courts, when passing on an appeal from an order granting a
new trial, from entering final judgment on the verdict if it
should decide the trial court erred in granting such motion.
Its power, as an appellate tribunal, is confined to reversing
the order and remanding the case to the trial court. An
attempt made in that case to have Section 77 of the Civil
Practice Act' 3 declared unconstitutional because in conflict
with Section 8 of the Appellate Courts Act,14 on the ground
that an order granting a new trial is not a "final" judgment
4 230 Ill. 496, 82 N.E. 860 (1907). See also Borreson v. Department of Public
Welfare, 368 IlR. 425, 14 N.E. (2d) 485 (1938).
5 Investors Syndicate of America v. Hughes, 378 Ill. 413, 38 N.E. (2d) 754 (1942).
6 Christensen v. R. W. Bartelmann Co., 273 Ill. 346, 112 N.E. 686 (1916).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 216 (1d).
s Schmidt v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 376 Ill. 183,
33 N.E. (2d) 485 (1941).
9 314 Ill. App. 389, 41 N.E. (2d) 548 (1942). On petition for rehearing, plaintiff
sought to supplement the record with photographs, maps and other data tending
to show a change in the facts since the trial. The offer was rejected, but without
prejudice to the plaintiff's right to submit the same to the trial court in a pro-
ceeding to modify the decree.
10 Sprague v. Goodrich, 376 Ill. 80, 32 N.E. (2d) 897 (1941). See also note in
19 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 275.
11 IlR. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 192 (3c).
12 379 Ill. 155, 39 N.E. (2d) 999 (1942), reversing 310 Ill. App. 421, 34 N.E. (2d)
879 (1941).
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 201.
14 I1. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 37, § 32.
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within the meaning of the latter, failed as the court recog-
nized a legislative intention to bring about an amendment
of the latter provision through the enactment of the former.
Of like nature is the decision in Herb v. Pitcairn"1 which
indicates that, whenever judgment has gone for defendant
on a motion non obstante veredicto, the appellate court, if
it should decide to reverse the same, must remand the pro-
ceedings to the trial court to entertain a motion for a new
trial if one be made, since, upon the earlier ruling, the trial
court had no occasion to consider this point.The defendant's
right to so move is not waived by the presentation of the
motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, 0 and, as the
appellate court may not pass thereon, remandment is essen-
tial.
Review by the Illinois Supreme Court of the decisions of
the appellate courts is circumscribed by the statutory re-
quirement that, in actions ex contractu and all cases sound-
ing in damages, the judgment ".... shall be for fifteen hun-
dred dollars ($1500.00) or more." 17 This requirement is not
satisfied, according to Martin v. Martin's Estate,"' by allow-
ing plaintiff to cumulate demands found in his favor but
totalling less than the jurisdictional amount with other de-
mands which were rejected by the trial court. For that mat-
ter, under the ruling in Antosz v. Goss Motors, Inc.,19 the
claims of several plaintiffs who have joined their individual
separate demands in one proceeding" may not be reviewed
by the Supreme Court even though the total sum awarded
them aggregates more than the jurisdictional amount if the
individual allotments are each below that figure.
Changes in both statutory provisions and rules of court
affecting appeals and appellate procedure, effective since
January 1, 1942, must be noted. In the past the jurisdiction
of the several appellate courts has been confined to appellate
review only, and, as a consequence, it has been limited to
15 377 Ill. 405, 36 N.E. (2d) 555 (1941), reversing 306 Ill. App. 583, 29 N.E. (2d)
543 (1940).
16 Cockrum v. Keller, 258 III. 276, 101 N.E. 594 (1913).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 199(2).
18 377 Ill. 392, 36 N.E. (2d) 742 (1941), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVLIW 174.
19 378 IIl. 608, 39 N.E. (2d) 322 (1942), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIw 174.
20 Joinder is permitted by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 147.
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reversing and remanding or else affirming the trial court's
decision. Frequently, the effect of the remanding order is
such that the trial court has only to enter a particular type
of order disposing of the case. At times, however, a new
trial becomes proper. It is now possible for the litigant, in
the latter situation, to signify that such new trial, if had,
could accomplish nothing and he may, therefore, request the
appellate court to delete that portion of the mandate remand-
ing the cause," so as to make it competent for the Supreme
Court to grant leave to appeal. The argument made on be-
half of the plaintiff in Corcoran v. City of Chicago22 has thus
been enacted into law.
In much the same way, statutory revision has been made
to clarify the doubt which has developed over the litigant's
right to secure review of an adverse decision. If, for any
reason not involving the litigant's culpable negligence, the
"short" appeal should fail because not properly carried
through, the statute now expressly authorizes the reviewing
court to grant leave to appeal within the period permissible
for "long" appeals.28  The decision in Spivey Building Cor-
poration v. Illinois Iowa Power Company,24 which denied
the right to two appeals even though one had failed for
reasons beyond the control of the litigant, is thereby ren-
dered nugatory.
Other slight statutory modifications have been made with
regard to appeals from orders granting new trials; 2 ap-
peals from interlocutory orders such as injunctions; 26 treat-
ing the appeal as a supersedeas ;27 giving the appellate tri-
bunal the right to recall a mandate already issued; 28 and
21 Laws 1941, I, 467, § 75(2); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 199(2). See also
added Rule 31A of the Supreme Court, 378 Ill. 14.
22 373 Ill. 567, 27 N.E. (2d) 451 (1940), noted in 19 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW REvIEw 91.
23 Laws 1941, II, 468, § 76; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 200(1). See also Rule 29
of the Supreme Court, 378 IM. 13.
24 375 Ill. 128, 30 N.E. (2d) 641 (1940), noted in 19 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW RTrvEw 274.
25 Laws 1941, II, 469, § 77(1); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 201(1). See also
Amended Rule 30 of the Supreme Court, 378 IlM. 13.
26 Laws 1941, II, 470, § 78; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 202.
27 Laws 1941, II, 470, § 82; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 206.
28 Laws 1941, II, 470, § 82(4); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 206(4).
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making notice of filing of the mandate in the inferior court
unnecessary except in cases where the cause is remanded
for new trial or further hearing. 9
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
In the case of Reconstruction Finance Corporation v.
Maley3° the local federal court was called upon to interpret
a state statute relating to the enforcement of judgments and
decrees." It appeared therein that the plaintiff had secured
a decree in its favor in a federal court located in a district
in which the debtor owned no real property. A certified copy
thereof was thereafter filed with the clerk of the state cir-
cuit court in a county wherein the debtor did own land. Ex-
ecution was issued by the originating federal court directed
to the marshal of the adjacent federal district who, in due
time, returned the same unsatisfied. No proceedings, beyond
the mere filing of the certified copy, were had in the state
court. In a later dispute over the effectiveness of such steps
to make the judgment a valid lien on the lands in question,
it was held the same were insufficient to establish a lien
since the execution which had been issued was ineffective
and the filing of the certified copy was not alone enough to
give statutory effect to the judgment for a period of more
than one year. To extend the life of such judgment as to lands
located in a county outside the jurisdiction of the court of
rendition, it was regarded as essential that execution should
issue from the court of the county in which the certified
copy had been filed. In so holding, the court affirmed the
rule that the lien of a judgment rendered by a federal court
is subject to the rules imposed by both the state32 and the
federal statute. 3 One interesting problem was left unan-
swered by the decision, i.e. whether a certified copy of a
decree or judgment was a "transcript of judgment" with-
in the meaning of the pertinent statute.34 The district court
29 Laws 1941, II, 471-2, § 88(2) and (4); ni. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 212(2) and
(4).
30 125 F. (2d) 131 (1942).
31 IMI. Rev. Stat. 1941, 0h. 77, § 1.
32 III. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 77, §§ 69-69a.
33 28 U. S. C. A. § 812.
34 IU. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 77, § 1.
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had held it was not such, but on appeal the court, though
intimating that perhaps it was, found it unnecessry to pass
specifically thereon. In view of the problem thus raised but
left unanswered, the judgment creditor must look carefully
to the preservation of his rights.
The case of Haugens v. Holmes35 dealt with a problem of
priority of lien, as between a recorded chattel mortgage and
an execution and levy under a judgment, upon chattels not
originally located within the county where the judgment was
rendered but into which they had been subsequently brought
and there seized. The court therein rejected the judgment
creditor's contention that his lien should be given retroac-
tive effect and should date back to the time when the sheriff
had first received the original execution. It was, instead,
held that the judgment lien took effect only from the time
when the chattels were brought into the county. A mortgage
lien, which had arisen from proper execution and recording
of a chattel mortgage in the county where the chattels were
then located, was held to possess priority over the rights of
the judgment creditor, even though the judgment had
been rendered earlier in point of time.
Two rather interesting cases dealt with the subject of
fraudulent conveyances. Though not involving the rights of
judgment creditors, they fit into situations frequently ob-
served in attempts to defeat such rights. In Prickett v. Prick-
ett36 the court held that the relationship of attorney and cli-
ent was so confidential that a court of equity was warranted
in extending its aid to a defrauded client to recover the prop-
erty even though the conveyance was made by him to hind-
er, delay or defraud his creditors. The relationship of the
parties therein was held enough to bring the case within the
exception to the general rule that equity will leave the par-
ties where they have placed themselves whenever they have
joined in a scheme to defraud.37 The case of Ford v.
Caspers3 8 on the other hand, involved a client and a real
35 314 Il1. App. 166, 41 N.E. (2d) 109 (1942).
36 379 Il. 181, 39 N.E. (2d) 984 (1942).
37 Rosenbaum v. Huebner, 277 ll. 360, 115 N.E. 558 (1917); Lang v. Lang, 284
IMI. 148, 119 N.E. 963 (1918).
8 42 F. Supp. 994 (1941).
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estate agent. The court there refused to intervene. Although
the court did not specifically deny that the relationship of
the parties was an exception to the general rule, such is the
necessary effect of the decision.
Reaffirming an old rule of law to the effect that assign-
ments for the benefit of creditors should not be so worded
or designed as to cut off non-assenting creditors, 9 is the
case of Tribune Company v. Canger Floral Company,0
which holds that, although common law assignments for the
benefit of creditors are still valid in Illinois, if the instrument
of assignment uses the words "full release" and "full settle-
ment" it must be regarded as void as to non-assenting credi-
tors because an element of duress is involved. The creditor
who does not participate will be sacrificing something to
which he has a right, hence the element of compulsion, no
matter how accomplished, renders the assignment void. The
decision may have a far-reaching effect on practices utilized
in the dissolution of business enterprises experiencing finan-
cial difficulties.
One statutory provision is of significance. Citation pro-
ceedings to discover the assets of a judgment debtor, such
as have been in use in the Municipal Court of Chicago for
many years,41 have now been made available to the other
courts of the state.42 The burden of proof in cases of alleged
fraudulent conveyances has wavered from time to time, be-
ing placed at times on the creditor,43 and, conversely, at
times on the grantee. 4 The latest expression on the sub-
ject, found in Cairo Lumber Company v. Landenberger,45
considers the responsibility to be that of the donee-grantee
who must prove that the debtor retained ample assets, fail-
ing which the gratuitous conveyance to himself must yield
to the superior rights of the creditor.
89 Marshall Field & Co. v. Obeler, 251 Ill. App. 529 (1929); International Shoe
Co. v. Cline, 279 IMl. App. 601 (1935).
40 312 Ill. App. 149, 37 N.E. (2d) 906 (1941), noted in 30 IMl. B. J. 333.
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 37, § 424.
42 Laws, 1941, II, 467, § 73(2); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 197(2). See also
added Rule 26A of the Supreme Court, 378 111. 12.
43 McKey v. McCoid, 298 Ill. 566, 132 N.E. 233 (1921).
44 Birney v. Solomon, 348 111. 410, 181 N.E. 318 (1932).
45 313 Ill. App. 1, 39 N.E. (2d) 596 (1942), noted in 30 I1. B. J. 380.
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IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
For many years the Illinois Criminal Code has contained
an unusual distinction between the crimes of burglary1 and
attempt to commit burglary.2 The former may be commit-
ted at any time, day or night, with or without the use of force
or breaking. The latter, on the other hand, can only occur
in the night-time. The reason for the distinction is not ap-
parent and probably results from an oversight.3 The dis-
tinction, however, was used to the advantage of the defend-
ant in People v. Glickman,4 in which case an indictment
charging burglary, but not mentioning that the same oc-
curred at night, was held inadequate to support a convic-
tion for attempt to commit burglary. The general rule that
an indictment charging the greater offense also includes the
lesser' was held to be inapplicable to this special situation.
A further argument to sustain the conviction on the ground
that it was predicated on the "attempt" section of the
statute6 was repudiated because that section, by its own
wording, applies only where no other express provision is
made, hence could not fit this case.
The person who strikes the first blow may, even though
the aggressor, regain the privilege of self-defense particu-
1 I. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 84.
2 Ibid, § 85.
3 The first statute in Illinois on the subject appears to be R. L. 1827, p. 133,
§ 60, which punished the completed crime if occurring in the night time. It made
no provision for the punishment of attempted burglary. This statute was amended
in various particulars from time to time. See Laws, 1831, p. 111, § 29, changing
form of punishment; Laws, 1859, p. 154, § 3, extending the coverage to certain
other structures; and Laws, 1869, p. 112, § 2, giving protection to every building.
These provisions were consolidated in Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 348, § 36, at which time
the requirement that the offense occur in the night time was still a part of the
law. The statute punishing attempt to commit burglary first appears in the 1874
revision. See Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 348, § 37, having the exact wording it bears today:
I11. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 85. The burglary statute was amended in 1877 by
eliminating the requirement that the offense occur at night, and by adding pro-
tection to certain other forms of property: Laws, 1877, p. 85, § 1. It is probable
that the oversight occurred at this session. Though the burglary statute has been
amended twice since then (Laws, 1885, p. 73, § 1, and Laws, 1927, p. 398, § 1), no
change has been made in the section covering attempt to commit burglary since
its first enactment.
4 377 IIl. 360, 36 N.E. (2d) 720 (1941), noted in 30 MI1. B. J. 161.
5 People v. Lewis, 375 Ill. 330, 31 N.E. (2d) 795 (1941); Reynolds v. People, 83
Ill. 479, 25 Am. Rep. 410 (1876).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 581.
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larly if he has withdrawn in good faith and has made his in-
tention known to the original victim. 7 Where such is the
case, the original victim, according to People v. Booker,8
may not thereafter pursue the former assailant and, upon
killing him, claim the privilege of self-defense since the es-
sential element that the danger must be reasonably appar-
ent at the time of killing would be lacking. In a somewhat
similar situation, told in People v. Jersky,10 the defendant
was permitted to rely on inconsistent defenses to the effect
that (a) the killing was done in self-defense, i.e. intention-
ally inflicted, and (b) the gun went off accidentally, i. e.
without defendant's intention that it should. Any confusion
engendered thereby was held to be the fault of the defend-
ant, and, consequently, he could not be heard to complain
that the jury might, therefore, have been unable to arrive
at the proper verdict."
Protection given to public utilities against the theft of their
products has been increased by the decision in People v.
Kraus2 which holds that water in the pipes of a waterworks
system is as much the subject of larceny as any other tan-
gible personal property. Though not an original idea," the
decision was foreshadowed in Woods v. People,4 dealing
with the theft of illuminating gas and People v. Menagas,5
holding that tapping electric power wires constituted lar-
ceny.
Although the common law offense of forgery required
the false making of a writing, so that affixing one's genuine
7 Rowe v. United States, 164 U.S. 546, 17 S. Ct. 172, 41 L. Ed. 547 (1896).
8 378 Ill. 334, 38 N.E. (2d) 32 (1941), noted in 26 Minn. L. Rev. 662.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 367; Kipley v. People, 215 Ill. 358, 74 N.E. 379
(1905).
10 377 Ill. 261, 36 N.E. (2d) 347 (1941), noted in 26 Marq. L. Rev. 167.
11 The probable basis for the decision, though not cited, is People v. Lee, 248
Ill. 64, 93 N.E. 321 (1910), in which defendant, charged with poisoning by mingling
carbolic acid in beer, sought to prove (a) he was not guilty, and (b) the poison
was not sufficient to cause death. It was regarded as error to deny defendant
the right to offer evidence on the latter point, the court saying: " . . . it is no
objection to testimony which tends to prove one defense that it is inconsistent with
other defenses that may be relied on." - 284 Ill. 64 at 70, 93 N.E. 321 at 323.
12 377 Ill. 539, 37 N.E. (2d) 182 (1941).
13 Clark v. State, 14 Old. Cr. 284, 170 P. 275, L.R.A. 1918C 577 (1917); Ferens
v. O'Brien, 11 Q.B.D. 21, 15 Cox C. C. 332 (1883).
14 222 Ill. 293, 78 N.E. 607, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 520, 113 Am. St. Rep. 415 (1906).
15 367 IM. 330, 11 N.E. (2d) 403, 113 A.L.R. 1276 (1937).
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signature could not involve that offense, 6 the present statu-
tory definition of that crime 7 is apparently broad enough
to prohibit that sort of conduct, if done with intent to de-
fraud, according to People v. Mau.'8 In so deciding,
the court not only negatived the earlier decision in People
v. Kramer" but also placed this state among a minority of
states so holding.
In the realm of criminal procedure, the case of People v.
Klemick ° is worthy of note for two reasons. In the first
place, the court decided that it was not erroneous to place
a defendant on trial at one time upon both an indictment
and an information, provided each covered related offenses.
In so joining the two accusations, the state was not violating
the positive rule that an indictment may not be amended,2
but the right to consolidate was limited by the requirement
that the added charge named in the information must not be
one which might subject the defendant to a more severe
punishment than could have been imposed under the indict-
ment. To permit consolidation where such result might be
possible was regarded as denying defendant the right to a
fair and impartial trial. The second point decided dealt with
the right to plead a former conviction for the purpose of
aggravating punishment.22 According to the view in some
states, the prior conviction may be relied upon, irrespective
of the time when the offense was committed, so long as
the conviction antedated the return of the indictment in the
instant case.2" Other states hold that the second offense must
have been committed after verdict returned on the first of-
fense.2 4 The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the latter view,
16 People v. Pfeiffer, 243 IM. 200, 90 N.E. 680, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 138 (1910).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 277.
18 377 IM. 199, 36 N.E. (2d) 235 (1941), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIw 180,
30 M11. B. J. 297, and 26 Marq. L. Rev. 165.
19 352 Ill. 304, 185 N.E. 590 (1933).
20 311 Ill. App. 508, 36 N.E. (2d) 846 (1941), noted in 26 Minn. L. Rev. 402.
21 Gannon v. People, 127 Ill. 507, 21 N.E. 525, 11 Am. St. Rep. 147 (1889); Patrick
v. People, 132 III. 529, 24 N.E. 619 (1890). An information, on the other hand, may
be amended at will so long as the exercise of the privilege does not interfere with
the orderly conduct of judicial business: Long v. People, 135 IM. 435, 25 N.E. 851,
10 L.R.A. 48 (1890).
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 325.
25 See, for example, State v. McCormick, 104 N. J. L. 288, 140 A. 297 (1928).
24 Singer v. United States, 278 F. 415 (1922), cert. den. 258 U.S. 620, 42 S. Ct.
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deeming the legislative purpose to be aimed at offenders
who, after one conviction, do not reform but persist in com-
mitting other offenses.25 While the "Habitual Criminal"
Act26 was not involved, the decision reflects the policy there-
of, since that statute specifically refers to second offenses
committed after the first conviction.
The Illinois Supreme Court has previously announced that
informality in the trial and disposition of criminal cases can-
not be tolerated if the defendant's constitutional right27 to
a fair and impartial trial is to be observed. 8 Despite this
injunction, the informality persists accordng to People v.
Hoffman,29 in which case a conviction for burglary was re-
versed because the hearing in no way resembled a trial. The
transcript therein showed that after some discussion about
a continuance, an informal colloquy occurred between the
assistant state's attorney and a police officer concerning
the alleged facts. What probably started out to be the dicta-
tion of a stipulation of facts degenerated into a recital of
hearsay to which the defendant's counsel made no objection.
It was also practically impossible to tell, from reading the
record, where the trial began and concluded. Such informal-
ity should not be tolerated, counsel permitting it should be
criticized, and, even though the case be tried without a jury,
the trial judge should insist that thd forms of law be ob-
served.
The power of the court to grant probation to a convicted
defendant 0 is conditioned by a requirement that, upon re-
quest for admission to probation, the court "shall require
the probation officer to investigate accurately and prompt-
ly ... such ... facts as may aid the court as well in deter-
272, 66 L. Ed. 795 (1922); Commonwealth v. McDermott, 224 Pa. 363, 73 A. 427,
24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 431 (1909).
25 In the instant case, the prosecution relied upon an earlier conviction predi-
cated upon an indictment dated April 12th, but trial upon which was incomplete
on November 2nd, when the instant indictment was returned. The judgment for
the earlier offense was not pronounced until November 10th, though the same was
in existence prior to the filing of the information consolidated with the indictment.
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 602.
27 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 9. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 736.
28 People v. Gardiner, 303 Ill. 204, 135 N.E. 422 (1922); People v. Nitti, 312 111. 73,
143 N.E. 448 (1924).
29 379 Ila. 318, 40 N.E. (2d) 515 (1942).
30 I1. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 784.
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mining the propriety of probation, as in fixing the conditions
thereof. ' 31 It was held, in People v. Donovan,32 that neither
the letter nor spirit of that statute had been observed when
the trial court, after plea of guilty, had denied probation
solely upon the statement of the State's Attorney to the ef-
fect that the defendant had admitted other offenses. Though
the granting of probation is a matter of discretion, 33 it is
now made clear that the duty to investigate before acting
on a request for probation is not subject to the exercise of
discretion.
Conviction for an infamous crime carries other con-
sequences beside imprisonment in the penitentiary. Accord-
ing to the Illinois statute,3 every person so convicted is,
forever thereafter, rendered incapable of holding any office
of honor, trust, or profit, of voting at any election, or of
serving as a juror, unless such rights be restored.3 5 Though
retaining citizenship, the person's status is necessarily some-
thing less than that of full citizenship.36 Because of this
fact, the convicted person, under the decision in Austin v.
United States,7 may not receive the benefit of those pro-
visions in the law permitting a person to sue, or prosecute
an appeal, as a poor person unless such right is specifically
made available to him or her.3 8
Further regulation of the business of retail selling of fire-
works, and the conduct of exploding the same except under
the supervision of a competent handler, is provided by a
statute which became operative on January 1, 1942, and
which statute, besides providing criminal penalties, permits
the seizure and destruction of the contraband property.3 9
V. FAMILY LAW
Three significant cases affecting the law of the family have
been decided during the past year. In the first, the case of
31 Il. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 786.
32 376 11. 602, 35 N.E. (2d) 54 (1941).
33 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 785.
34 Iil. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 587.
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 108, § 49.
36 Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. (11 Ky.) 326 (1822).
37 40 F. Supp. 777 (1941).
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 769a.
39 Laws 1941, II, p. 430; IM. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 276.27 et seq.
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Peirce v. Peirce,1 the Illinois statute declaring "common
law" marriages null and void' was held to be confined, in
its application, to this state and, hence, could have no bear-
ing upon such irregular unions as may be formed elsewhere.
Children born to parents so united would be deemed illegiti-
mate in this state, 3 though they might later be made legiti-
mate through parental compliance with the statutory re-
quirements of securing a license and having a ceremony
performed.4 It would now seem, from the decision in the
Peirce case, that the same result might be accomplished if
the parents were to enter into a "common law" union in a
foreign jurisdiction where such forms of marriage are per-
mitted, since the Illinois requirements of license and cere-
mony would not there apply. Also implicit in the case, is the
fact that mere continued cohabitation after the impediment
to valid marriage has been removed, as by death or divorce
of the pre-existing spouse of one of the parties to such union,
will be enough to constitute a marriage even though the
other party is unaware of such fact.'
The ex-spouse who seeks to avoid his alimony obligations
by migrating to Illinois will, hereafter, find small comfort in
the decision in Rule v. Rule. 6 In that case the successful
plaintiff in a Nevada divorce sought to enforce the provi-
sions of the decree respecting the payment of alimony, both
past due and to accrue, through an equitable proceeding be-
fore an Illinois court. The obligated defendant, now resident
in this state, moved to dismiss the proceedings on the ground
that the only relief open to plaintiff was by a suit as in debt
on a foreign judgment for such of the past due alimony as
had been reduced to formal judgment in Nevada. 7 The "full
faith and credit" to be given to the Nevada decree, in com-
pliance with constitutional mandate,8 he argued, should be
1 379 Ill. 185, 39 N.E. (2d) 990 (1942).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 89, § 4.
3 Brainard v. Brainard, 373 Ill. 459, 26 N.E. (2d) 856 (1940).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 89, § 4.
5 See dissent by Holmes, J., in Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U. S. 423, 27 S. Ct.
563, 51 L. Ed. 865 (1907). Compare with Land v. Land, 206 Ill. 288, 68 N.E. 1109
(1903).
6 313 Ill. App. 108, 39 N.E. (2d) 379 (1942), noted in 37 Ill. L. Rev. 89.
7 See, for example, Dow v. Blake, 46 Ill. App. 329 (1892) affirmed in 148 Ill. 76,
35 N.E. 761, 39 Am. St. Rep. 156 (1893).
8 U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 1.
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confined solely to its legal aspects, and should not require
the equitable enforcement thereof. Despite this, the Illinois
Appellate Court held, for the first time in this state, that the
decree of Nevada should be given equitable enforcement in
this state utilizing, if necessary, the full powers of equity as
by way of contempt proceedings, in order to give full faith
and credit to the foreign decree. Provision was made, how-
ever, to make the Illinois decree conform to the one ren-
dered in Nevada by requiring that, if modification of the lat-
ter should occur, then similar modification should be made
in the former. If the decision should stand, Illinois has been
added to the respectable minority of states already granting
co-operative enforcement of foreign alimony decrees.9
The common law duty of the parents to support their chil-
dren was enlarged, by the Paupers Act, ° so as to impose
the obligation upon a larger class of relatives and in favor of
a larger group of dependents. A statutory form of action to
compel support is also authorized thereby to obviate the ne-
cessity of using an action as in general assumpsit for "nec-
essaries" already furnished." The same statute also per-
mits one town to secure reimbursement from another for
the support which it may have been obliged to furnish to the
migrant dependent. It became necessary for the court, in
Town of Aroma Park v. Town of Papineau,12 to point out
that the two obligations are different, both in scope and meth-
od of enforcement. The former is prospective in nature, is
not the basis for liability prior to the rendition of a judgment
in proceedings brought under Section 3 of the act,13 and im-
poses no duty on the able relatives to reimburse the town
for advancements already made. The latter is, however, ret-
roactive as it permits recovery by the one town from the
other for all advancements made. 14 Moreover, while the pro-
ceeding against the relatives of the dependent must be
9 See Jacobs, "The Enforcement of Foreign Decrees for Alimony," 6 Law &
Cont. Prob. 250 (1939).
10 111. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 107, § 1-3.
11 The statutory action is made more effective than the common law action
through the use of attachment as for contempt: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 107, § 11.
12 313 Il. App. 135, 39 N.E. (2d) 396 (1942).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 107, § 3.
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 107, § 16.
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brought in the county court, 5 the case for reimbursement
instituted by the town may properly come before the circuit
court.
VI. PROPERTY
REAL PROPERTY
The oil boom in Illinois can be credited with responsibility
for many interesting decisions and some new law emanat-
ing from both the higher courts and the federal courts sitting
in this state during the past year. The case of Pure Oil Com-
pany v. Miller-McFarland Drilling Company' involved the
effect of an attempted conveyance of a possibility of re-
verter. In 1896 one Hubble conveyed a tract of land to the
trustees of a certain church "to belong to the Church . . . so
long as used by aforesaid Church this deed to be in full forse
at any time if not used by said Church the aforesaid de-
scribed land to revert back to the original owner." There-
after in the same year Hubble made a conveyance of the
same land or whatever interest he had in it to Ann Behymer.
The church ceased holding services in 1927. In 1938 John
Hubble gave a mineral deed for the property involved to the
Pure Oil Company. In 1940 the trustees of the church gave
an oil lease to Miller-McFarland Drilling Co., Inc., who pre-
pared to drill for oil. Pure Oil Company sued to enjoin the
drilling company from proceeding with their designs.
After holding that the estate conveyed to the church trus-
tees was a fee on conditional limitation and not on condition
subsequent, the court was confronted with the problem of
deciding among three possible results. It could hold the con-
veyance to Ann Behymer was of no effect whatever; that it
extinguished the possibility of reverter so as to leave the
church in possession of an unconditional fee; or that the deed
to Ann Behymer, though ineffective at the time, became ef-
fective by virtue of Section 7 of the Conveyances Act2 after
the estate reverted to Hubble. As all the necessary evidence
was not before the court, the case was remanded for further
15 IMl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 107, § 3.
1 376 IMl. 486, 34 N.E. (2d) 854 (1941), noted in 30 IM. B. J. 334.
2 I1. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, 1 6.
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proceedings, but the court remarked that the attempted con-
veyance of the possibility of reverter did not extinguish it
and that if the deed from Hubble to Ann Behymer had been
a warranty deed, the Conveyances Act would have operated
to vest the title in her after title had reverted to Hubble.
Shell Oil Company v. Manley Oil Corporation3 is probably
the first case in which a court of appellate jurisdiction has
been called upon to determine whether, in Illinois, a grant
of "surface only" subject to a deed theretofore made to an-
other of certain minerals, gives to the grantee a right to such
minerals as might remain in the land, or whether, by impli-
cation, the grantor is reserving such minerals to himself.
The court considered the cases decided in West Virginia
where "surface," when used in conjunction with an excep-
tion or reservation of certain minerals less than all, is given
a meaning different from that where the word is used alone.
But the court decided that in Illinois "surface" was to be
understood in its commonly accepted sense, whether used
simpliciter or in conjunction with exceptions or reservations
of certain minerals, and that the grantor in the case before
it had reserved to himself the mineral rights not previously
conveyed.
Whether the reservation of a fractional interest in the rents
and royalties that might arise out of present or future leases
constituted a reservation of the rights in a proportionate
amount of the oil in place was the question presented to the
court in Vandenbark v. Busiek4 and answered in the affirm-
ative on the ground that where the entire profit of land is
given perpetually, the land itself passes. By analogy, the
royalty being the profit of the oil, a perpetual reservation
of the royalties would be a reservation of the oil in place as
real property.
In another case, that of Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin
Coal Company v. Herr,' by a deed made in 1905 to the prede-
cessors of the plaintiff, there had been conveyed "all the
coal, oil, and gas in and under" certain lands, together with
3 124 F. (2d) 714 (1942).
4 126 F. (2d) 893 (1942).
5 127 F. (2d) 1010 (1942), affirming 40 F. Supp. 311 (1941), which was discussed
in 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 514.
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the right to "take and use so much of the surface of said
lands as the grantee" might deem necessary or convenient
for the production thereof, provided that "all the land at the
surface which is so taken shall be paid for when so taken at
the rate of $50 per acre." The defendants argued that this
constituted an option to acquire an easement when the land
should be designated and that, since the easement might
not vest within the period prescribed by the rule against per-
petuities, the grant was void. The court rejected this con-
tention, however, relying upon an Illinois decision6 which
had decided that the right to use the surface was vested at
the time of the deed as a right incident to the right to remove
the minerals and that therefore the deed added nothing by
its terms except the details of payment.
In yet another case, involving the same plaintiff, the deed
had granted the oil and gas together with the right, for the
purpose of removal thereof, to select and use surface areas
provided the selection and payment therefor was made with-
in a time fixed by the deed. That time expired before the
surface areas were selected and paid for, and the court held
that the right of the grantee to the use of the surface was
gone, but that the minerals had been granted in fee simple
and were still the property of the grantee and the owner of
the surface could not himself take such oil and gas.7
The troublesome question of the nature of a railroad's in-
terest in land conveyed for its use was again before the court
in Hicks v. Thomson.' The granting clause of the deed to
the railway "conveyed and quitclaimed . . . a strip of land
50 feet in width on each side of the center line of the track.
" The habendum clause recited that the grantee was
"to have and to hold . . . for railroad purposes only." The
grantor's successors in title claimed that the grant was of an
easement only and not a fee and that to lease a part of that
property for the operation of an automobile filling station
constituted an abandonment of the easement. The court,
6 Threlkeld v. Inglett, 289 I1. 90, 124 N.E. 368 (1919).
7 Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Minier, 127 F. (2d) 1006 (1942),
affirming 40 F. Supp. 316 (1941), which was discussed in 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 345
and 31 IMl. B. J. 74.
8 (Also sub nomn. In re Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.), 127 F. (2d) 1001 (1942).
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relying upon the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision of
Tailman v. Eastern Illinois and Peoria Railroad Company,"
held that the railway's interest was an easement and not a
fee, but held that there was not an abandonment but merely
a misuser. In the latter case, the court had applied the
language of Section 13 of the Conveyances Act 0 and con-
strued the deed as giving an easement rather than a fee, but
the language used in the deed indicated a much plainer in-
tent to give an easement than did the language in the Hicks
case by calling the instrument a "Right of Way Deed," and
by several times using the expression "right of way." From
the Hicks case we may assume that, in the construction of a
deed, the words "for railroad purposes only" are the equiva-
lent of "right of way for a railroad."
The rule in Shelley's case was given application to the
peculiarly ambiguous language of a will in Henry v. Henry."
The will read:
I leave and bequeath unto my beloved wife Sarah A. Henry all my
estate, consisting of all property, both real and personal property, to
have and to hold the same during her natural life and at her death, the
residue, if any, shall be equally divided between my brothers and sisters
and her heirs in equal parts.' 2
The testator had nine brothers and sisters. The court was
called upon to determine the extent of the widow's interest
in fee under the rule in Shelley's case-whether she took one-
half or one-tenth. As a matter of construction, the court de-
termined that the widow took one-half in fee.
The compensation for land taken on eminent domain pro-
ceedings was allocated entirely to the holder of a fee on con-
dition subsequent in United States v. 1,119.15 Acres of Land,
Williamson County.13 Under the language of the deed therein
involved, which recited ". . . when said land ceases to be
used for school purposes it is to revert to the above grantor,
his heirs," the argument was made that the grantor would
be entitled to the compensation, because, as a result of the
eminent domain proceedings, the land would cease to be
9 379 IM. 441, 41 N.E. (2d) 537 (1942).
10 IM. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 12.
11 378 Ill. 581, 39 N.E. (2d) 18 (1942), noted in 36 IM. L. Rev. 798.
12 378 Ill. 581 at 582, 39 N.E. (2d) 18 at 19.
13 44 F. Supp. 449 (1942).
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used for school purposes and, consequently, the reversioner
should receive the compensation in lieu of the land which
would have reverted. The court followed the weight of au-
thority in other jurisdictions and held that in the absence
of a showing of imminence or likelihood of abandonment by
the school for its purposes, the school was entitled to the
full compensation.
Real estate speculators have, in the past, taken convey-
ances of land with the name of the grantee left blank, in-
tending to fill in the name of some subsequent purchaser
when, and if, secured. Such practice would result in the con-
veyance being a nullity unless the grantor authorized the
speculator, as agent, to complete the deed before delivery. 4
Apparently, to obviate such result, the speculator has now
developed the idea of presenting a deed, naming a fictitious
person as grantee, for signature by the grantor. Later, the
speculator would then make a retransfer of the property
using a deed signed by some genuine person writing the
name of the fictitious grantee. Such practice, according to
Chance v. Kimbrell,15 is no more effective than the former
method since a valid conveyance requires a person capable
of receiving the grant. The case, however, should be distin-
guished from a conveyance to an existing grantee to whom
title is intended to pass but under a name other than the
correct one.16
Echoes of the depression, and the wholesale forfeiture of
real estate instalment purchase contracts which followed in
its wake, still resound in the courts. Thus, in Forest Preserve
Real Estate Improvement Corporation v. Miller,17 the ven-
dor, after substantial default in payment and long delay, had
notified the purchaser that the latter's interest in the prem-
ises was terminated and all payments forfeited. The pur-
chaser vacated the premises, but later asserted that a
recission had occurred, through his election to treat an im-
14 Tucker v. Kanatzar, 373 Ill. 162, 25 N.E. (2d) 823 (1940); Donnelly v. Duman-
owski, 329 III. 482, 160 N.E. 759 (1928); Osby v. Reynolds, 260 M1l. 576. 103 N.E. 556
(1913).
15 376 Ill. 615, 35 N.E. (2d) 48 (1941).
16 Wilson v. White, 84 Cal. 239, 24 P. 114 (1890); Chapman v. Tyson, 39 Wash.
523, 81 P. 1066 (1905); Thomas v. Wyatt, 31 Mo. 188, 77 Am. Dec. 640 (1860).
17 379 Ill. 375, 41 N.E. (2d) 526 (1942).
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proper forfeiture as such, and demanded the return of
all sums paid under the contract. The vendor sued to re-
move the contract as a cloud upon the title. 8 To this suit,
the purchaser filed a counterclaim to recover the sums so
paid. In denying recovery under the counterclaim, the court
found that the vendor had taken all proper steps and had
allowed a reasonable time to remedy defaults before declar-
ing the forfeiture, but also dismissed the vendor's complaint
on the ground that the forfeiture had not become consummate
because written declaration of forfeiture had not been re-
corded in compliance with the terms of the contract itself
which fixed the manner of forfeiture. Since forfeitures are
not favored, the result is no doubt correct, but the case sug-
gests the possibility that other similar suits might arise in
the future where the parties may have thought that a com-
plete forfeiture had occurred, but where the facts may still
allow the defaulting vendee a chance to salvage his invest-
ment.
MORTGAGES
Several significant decisions affecting the law of mort-
gages and related matters have been handed down dur-
ing the period under consideration. For example, in earlier
days the practitioner who was about to institute a mortgage
foreclosure proceeding had to draw some nice distinctions
between claims arising under the mortgage and those in-
dependent of it. The latter, of course, had to be excluded
since they were not germane."9 Since the enactment of the
Civil Practice Act it would seem as though this distinction
is no longer necessary," but, according to Korngabiel v.
Fish,2' if counsel insist upon observing the older rule, the
holder of the independent claim may not interject his dis-
18 The court pointed out that this form of remedy was not available in the instant
case since the contract in question had not been recorded: Allott v. American
Strawboard Co., 237 Ill. 55, 86 N.E. 685 (1908); Parker v. Shannon, 121 Ill. 452,
13 N.E. 155 (1887); Howe v. Hutchison, 105 Il1. 501 (1883).
19 Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Hoge, 359 Ill. 36, 193 N.E. 660 (1934).
20 Bobzien v. Schwartz, 289 Ill. App. 299, 7 N.E. (2d) 362 (1937), noted in 15
CHcAGo-KENT REViEW 303; Kronan Building & Loan Association v. Medeck, 368 Ill.
118, 13 N.E. (2d) 66 (1938), noted in 16 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW REVw 279.
21 313 IMI. App. 286, 40 N.E. (2d) 314 (1942), noted in 20 CHIAGO-KENT LAw
REvxiw 354.
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pute into the foreclosure proceedings. Even though the act
contemplates a "complete determination of the controver-
sy,''22 it seems to have been the view of the court therein
that the decision of plaintiff's counsel as to the scope of the
foreclosure proceeding should control.
Mistakes made by the draftsman may prevent a mort-
gage from becoming a valid legal mortgage with all the in-
cidents usually appertaining thereto. It may, nevertheless,
be still enforcible as an equitable lien provided the court
can find an intention to make some particular property stand
as security for the debt,23 hence, since most foreclosure
proceedings are brought in equity,24 such mistakes may
easily be overcome. Such was the case in Harney v. Col-
well 5 where the mortgagors, though signing the purchase
money mortgage and principal note, forgot to endorse the
note which was payable to themselves, so as to make the
same negotiable. It was, nevertheless, held that the mort-
gage constituted an enforcible equitable lien since the requi-
site intention was apparent and subsequent transfers of the
mortgage and note by manual delivery were enough to con-
stitute equitable assignments of the same.
The problem of the continuing liability of the mortgagor,
after sale of the mortgaged premises to a grantee who as-
sumes and agrees to pay the debt, has been before the court
on many occasions. Complications are added to the case
when, at maturity of the debt, the holder grants an exten-
sion without securing the consent of the mortgagor. A new
wrinkle was introduced, in Conerty v. Richsteig, 6 when the
holder sought to impose liability for a deficiency on the
original makers, some eleven years after maturity date and
over thirteen years after they had parted with the property,
by reason of a provision in the mortgage which read: "The
grantors covenant and agree . . . to pay said indebtedness
22 Mll. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 149.
23 Aldrich v. R. J. Ederer Company, 302 Ill. 391, 134 N.E. 726 (1922); Freeman
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 304 Ill. App. 517, 26 N.E. (2d) 714 (1940).
24 Foreclosure under power of sale was abolished by statute in Illinois in 1879.
See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 95, § 23.
25 314 Ill. App. 173, 41 N.E. (2d) 123 (1942).
26 379 M11. 360, 41 N.E. (2d) 476 (1942), reversing 308 Il. App. 321, 31 N.E. (2d)
351 (1941).
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and the interest thereon, as herein and in said notes pro-
vided, or according to any agreement extending time of pay-
ment."27 The holder contended the debt had not been out-
lawed since the assuming grantee had entered into exten-
sion agreements which, so it was claimed, kept the obliga-
tion of the original mortgagors alive. The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, came to the conclusion that the provision in
the mortgage did not operate to perpetuate the personal ob-
ligation on the note since the two documents were to be re-
garded as separate undertakings.2" As the pertinent language
did not appear in the note either expressly or by refer-
ence,29 and as the right to a deficiency judgment could,
under the statute,30 only be predicated thereon, it followed
that the running of the statutory period barred the liability
of the maker thereof.
The principle that the plaintiff should not be allowed to
"disturb the courts and vex the parties with many actions
'3 1
operated, in Skolnik v. Petella,2 to relieve an assuming
grantee of the mortgaged premises from personal liability
on the assumed mortgage debt. It appeared from the facts
therein that, upon default, the trustee foreclosed naming
the makers and the assuming grantee as defendants. After
sale, a deficiency judgment was rendered against the mak-
ers but not against the assuming grantee, even though the
latter had been served personally. The reason for the omis-
sion was not made apparent, but probably resulted from
oversight. Later on, one of the bondholders brought an ac-
tion as in assumpsit to recover the unpaid balance due from
the assuming grantee upon the bonds held. Motion by de-
fendant to dismiss the suit, based upon the proposition that
the earlier foreclosure proceedings were res adjudicata, was
27 Italics added.
28 It has been held, for example, that provisions in the mortgage for the pay-
ment of costs, taxes, insurance, etc., cannot be regarded as increasing the personal
liability of the maker of the note when sued on the latter instrument: Hunter v.
Clarke, 184 Ill. 158, 56 N.E. 297, 75 Am. St. Rep. 160 (1900).
29 Oswianza v. Wengler & Mandell, Inc., 358 Ill. 302, 193 N.E. 123 (1934).
so Ii. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 95, § 17.
31 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Mayo, 170 Ill. 498 at 502, 48 N.E. 917 at 919 (1897).
32 376 Ill. 500, 34 N.E. (2d) 825 (1941), affirming 304 Iil. App. 331, 26 N.E. (2d)
646 (1940). Gunn, Ch. J., Farthing, J., and Wilson, J., dissented without opinion.
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sustained," the court pointing out that the mortgage holder
may not rely upon Section 16 of the Mortgages Act 4 for the
purpose of securing a deficiency judgment against one
person and refuse to be bound by it as against another lia-
ble on the same debt.35 Failure to make the necessary al-
legations in the complaint to support a decree against both
does not, and should not, change the rule.
During the period from 1917 to 1921 the law relating to the
foreclosure of mortgages provided for a different manner of
dealing with the sale of the mortgaged premises than pres-
ently exists, 8 but when that method was abolished, a sav-
ing clause kept the same alive as to mortgages made dur-
ing that period. 7 As a consequence, the attorney for the
mortgagee must be careful to determine which method
should be used, since a deed issued under an erroneous sale
would probably be a nullity. If, however, the wrong meth-
od has been followed, some comfort may be obtained from
the decision in Flanagan v. Wilson" which holds that the
mortgagor may not remove such deed as a cloud on the title
unless he is prepared to do equity by paying either the
mortgage debt or the amount bid at the sale with accumu-
lated interest. The claim that not only was the deed a nullity
but the mortgage had been extinguished by the proceeds of
88 Stone, J., specially concurring, deemed that the failure of the trustee to seek
a personal judgment against the assuming grantee was to be regarded as a
"waiver" of such claim rather than a matter of res adjudicata. To the argument
that such waiver should not be considered that of the bondholder since the fore-
closure proceedings were under the exclusive management of the trustee, he
answered that the latter's conduct was binding upon the beneficiaries whom he
represented.
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 95, § 17.
35 The mortgagee is not obliged to rely on Section 16 to secure a personal judg-
ment. He may use his legal remedy on the note against the mortgagor, Hazle v.
Bondy, 173 Ill. 302, 50 N.E. 671, (1898), or sue at law on the assumption contract,
Harts v. Emery, 184 i1. 560, 56 N.E. 865 (1900). He may, of course, secure only
one satisfaction. If the liability asserted is purely secondary as, for example,
against a guarantor, the claim may not be asserted in the foreclosure proceeding,
but must be relegated to a subsequent action: Walsh v. Van Horn, 22 IMI. App. 170
(1887), Christensen v. Niedert, 259 Ill. App. 96 (1930).
36 See Rev. Stat. 1917, Ch. 77, §§ 16-30a, which provided that the sale should
come at the end of the redemption period instead of initiating it, as is the present
rule under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 77, § 18.
87 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 77, § 32.
88 310 ]1l. App. 557, 35 N.E. (2d) 87 (1941), in which plaintiff's appeal to the
.llinois Supreme Court had been transferred: 375 IL 179, 30 N.E. (2d) 647 (1940).
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sale was there held to be untenable. As a consequence, a
decree granting such relief on condition that the mortgagor
do equity within a short day or else be barred from assert-
ing any right to the mortgaged premises was upheld.
Three decisions concerning chattel mortgages are worthy
of note. Thus the conditional interest of a buyer of goods un-
der conditional sale is sufficient to support a chattel mort-
gage according to Automobile Service Corporation v. Com-
munity Motors, Incorporated,9 so that a third person deal-
ing with such property in derogation of the rights of the hold-
er of the chattel mortgage is bound to answer for the dam-
age thereby caused. Necessarily, though, the rights of the
chattel mortgagee are inferior to those of the conditional
vendor. In the second case, Illinois National Bank & Trust
Company v. Holmes,40 the validity of a chattel mortgage as
affecting the rights of third persons, particularly with ref-
erence to the issue of whether or not the date of the instru-
ment or the actual date of execution is controlling, was there
considered. The statutory requirement4 that the mort-
gage, to be valid, must be recorded within ten days after
execution, was called into question since doubt was involved
as to whether date of "execution" meant stated date or ac-
tual date. It was held that, no showing of fraud being pres-
ent, the date of execution was the basic date.
The lien of a chattel mortgage may extend to the proceeds
of sale of the mortgaged property, according to Acme
Feeds, Inc. v. Daniel,42 so as to prevent a creditor, through
garnishment, from acquiring a better right thereto pro-
vided the mortgagee, in giving consent to the sale, express-
ly stipulates that the proceeds shall go toward the satisfac-
tion of the mortgage debt. An argument that, to be effect-
ive, such conditional consent must be in writing so as to
prevent a possible fraud on the rights of the attaching cred-
itor was rejected on the ground that such creditor can ac-
39 312 Ill. App. 263, 38 N.E. (2d) 512 (1941), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
Rzmvw 267.
40 311 IMI. App. 286, 35 N.E. (2d) 823 (1941), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEw 99.
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 95, § 4.
42 312 IMI. App. 330, 38 N.E. (2d) 530 (1941), noted in 30 Ill. B. J. 381.
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quire no better right to the fund than is possessed by the
mortgagor.
48
Only one decision of importance dealt with a question of
mechanics' lien law. The sufficiency of an affidavit given
pursuant to Section 5 of the Mechanics' Liens Act" was
considered in Ceco Steel Products Corporation v. Couri.
4 5
It was there found to be insufficient to defeat the claim of a
materialman who had not been paid by the general contrac-
tor.46 It appeared that certain asbestos shingles had been used
on defendant's residence, and, at the time of payment, the
general contractor had furnished an affidavit stating that the
materials used "belonged to us and were our exclusive prop-
erty no one having any interest or claim therein." Despite
the fact that the materials had been sold, and title thereto
had passed, to the general contractor, the lien claim was up-
held on the ground that the affidavit did not comply with
Section 5 which required that it should disclose "the names
of all parties furnishing materials. . . " The court distin-
guished the situation from one in which the general contrac-
tor furnishes a false affidavit disclosing the name of the ma-
terialman but representing that he had been paid in full, in
which case, absent any knowledge or suspicion of the falsity
thereof, the owner would be protected.4"
TRUSTS
The steady accumulation of precedents has not made the
distinction between the trust and the equitable charge easier
to draw. In a recent case 48 the Supreme Court considered
the effect of the following language:
I give, devise and bequeath the remaining undivided half of my real
estate, subject to the life estate therein of my said wife, to my said son,
Earl H. Dial, as trustee for my daughter Mildred Dial, who is afflicted,
and I enjoin upon him to see that she has proper care and attention as
long as she lives. Upon the death of my said daughter, the title in fee
43 Elzy v. Morrison, 180 Ill. App. 711 (1913).
44 fll. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 82, § 5.
45 311 Ill. App. 297, 35 N.E. (2d) 810 (1941).
46 Il. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 82, § 32.
47 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Halsey Co., 262 Ill. 241, 104 N.E. 665 (1914).
48 Dial v. Dial, 378 Ill. 276, 38 N.E. (2d) 43 (1941).
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to the share so bequeathed to my said son as trustee, shall go to my said
son Earl H. Dial, in fee simple absolute. 49
The daughter of the testator was an inmate of an institution
for the mentally afflicted. The son died and his administra-
trix filed a suit to construe the will. The majority of the
court, relying upon Section 10 of the Restatement of Trusts,
held that the language created a trust and imposed fidu-
ciary obligations upon the son. It was said that a successor
trustee should be appointed and an accounting decreed. Mr.
Justice Wilson thought that the language created an equit-
able charge or incumberance on the property. He also relied
on Section 10 of the Restatement. His dissenting opinion at-
taches considerable significance to the fact that the sole duty
imposed upon the alleged trustee was to provide the same
care for the daughter after the testator's death as she had
received before, and the accumulation of a fund for her bene-
fit could have served no purpose. Hence, it was submitted,
the true intention was to vest the beneficial interest in the
son subject only to the charge for the care of the daughter.
The case well illustrates the need for careful draftsmanship
when dealing with trusts to distinguish them from other
property devices to which they have a marked similarity.
The line between the trust and the equitable charge is es-
pecially fine when the latter is coupled with a personal obli-
gation.
In spite of the growing dissatisfaction with the spendthrift
trust it appears well entrenched, for the time being at least,
in the law of Illinois. The case of McKeown v. Pridmore"
presented a novel situation respecting the protection af-
forded by the spendthrift clause. The beneficiary and the
trustee were involved in a controversy over the right of the
trustee to apply money due the beneficiary against an in-
debtedness of the beneficiary to the estate. The beneficiary
hired an attorney to assert his claim against' the trustee,
agreeing to pay such attorney a contingent fee. The attorney
served notice of attorney's lien upon the trustee and was
finally successful in overcoming the trustee's claim to set
49 378 IMl. 276 at 278, 38 N.E. (2d) 43 at 45.
5o 310 IM. App. 634, 35 N.E. (2d) 376 (1941), noted in 36 IMl. L. Rev. 674 and
9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 360.
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off the amount due the beneficiary. The trustee paid the
beneficiary and the attorney sought to collect his fee from
the trustee individually and as trustee. The appellate court
relied on Baker v. Baker," as authority to the effect that the
notice of attorney's lien operates as an assignment of an in-
terest in the proceeds of any settlement, but held that the
spendthrift clause operated to prevent the beneficiary from
making any effective assignment.
A second point of interest in the McKeown case arose out
of the fact that the beneficiary had voluntarily allowed
money due him to remain with the trustee. Upon the death
of the beneficiary it was held that the protection of the spend-
thrift clause ceased, hence the trustee had a right to apply
such money toward the satisfaction of the indebtedness owed
by the beneficiary to the estate.
Two cases involving questions of administration are of in-
terest. One of them, Heyl v. Northern Trust Company,52 in-
volved the troublesome problem of apportionment between
income and principal. The trust was created in 1910 by will
and the trustee was directed to sell the real estate as soon as
it could be done without sacrifice, and add the proceeds to
the principal. All the real estate was sold by 1911 except an
undivided interest in certain land in Texas. In 1936 the trustee
entered into an oil lease of this land, and, when oil and
gas were discovered in 1937, the trustee received a cash
payment and royalties under the lease. The court, citing
Illinois cases, 53 held that the oil lease amounted to a sale
of a portion of the property. The trustee, after paying ex-
penses, allocated the sums received on the basis of ascer-
taining the sum which, with simple interest thereon at the
rate of five per cent. per annum from the date of the dis-
covery of oil and gas, would equal the net amount received
by the trustee. The sum so ascertained was treated as
principal and the balance was income. The court held this
apportionment proper, citing Section 241 of the Restatement
of Trusts. The opinion did not discuss the possibility that the
51 258 Ill. 418, 101 N.E. 587 (1913).
52 312 Ill. App. 207, 38 N.E. (2d) 374 (1942).
53 Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughetee, 240 Ill. 361, 88 N.E. 818 (1909); Triger v. Carter
Oil Co., 372 Ill. 182, 23 N.E. (2d) 55 (1939).
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testator indicated a contrary intent by directing that the
proceeds be added to the principal.54 Apportionment of the
costs of the proceeding, which the chancellor had ordered
charged one-half to income and one-half to principal, was
approved.
In Campbell v. Albers,55 the appellate court held that the
Illinois statute on the investment of trust funds56 is not in-
tended to absolve trustees from the duty of exercising care
in the selection of investments within the approved classes.
The conduct of the trustees, in purchasing bonds in the name
of the bank of which they were officers and, two days later,
transferring the bonds to the trust at a profit, was disap-
proved. In this case the trustees had also deposited trust
funds in a savings account in the same bank. It later closed.
The court indicated that the bank had knowledge, through
its officers, the trustees, of the improper character of these
deposits, hence a preferred claim was allowed against the
receiver. The court said that "a trustee is not permitted to
place himself in a position where it will be difficult for him
to be honest and faithful to his trust."
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
The evolution of a law and the ability of the legislature
and courts to make it conform to changing economic con-
ditions and practices is well illustrated in the case of In re
Edwards' Estate,57 in which the appellate court construed
Section 336 of the Probate Act,58 dealing with the fees of
executors, administrators, administrators to collect, guar-
dians and conservators. Prior to the adoption of the present
statute, Section 133 of the former Administration Act had
provided that executors and administrators:
shall be allowed as compensation for their services a sum not exceeding
six per centum on the amount of personal estate, and not exceeding three
per centum on the money arising from the sale of real estate, with such
54 See the discussion of intent in Love v. Engelke, 368 Ill. 342, 14 N.E. (2d) 228
(1938), noted in 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 44.
55 313 Ill. App. 152, 39 N.E. (2d) 672 (1942).
56 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 148, § 32.
57 312 Ill. App. 645, 39 N.E. (2d) 72 (1942).
58 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 490.
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additional allowances for costs and charges in collecting and defending
the claims of the estate and disposing of the same as shall be reason-
able. 59
In the earlier case of Willard v. Bassett" it was held, under
the statute then in force, that an administrator or executor
should not take the office as a business or as a means of
making money, but that it was to a certain extent associated
with the idea of benevolence or philanthropy. But that case
was decided at a time when the decedent's estate usually
consisted of real estate and, perchance, a few items of tan-
gible personal property, and at a time when there were no
such things as inheritance taxes, estate taxes, and income
taxes. The work of the executor or administrator then was
obviously very limited.
In this modern age, however, the decedent's estate fre-
quently consists of a large number of items of personal
estate, the titles to which pass to the executor or administra-
tor for purposes of administration and, along with the mod-
ern tax problems, there is thereby necessitated a great deal
of work and the exercise of far more judgment than was
formerly the case. When the present Probate Act was pass-
ed, therefore, it provided that "an executor, administrator,
administrator to collect, guardian or conservator shall be
allowed reasonable compensation for his services....", By
this language, the legislature obviously intended to recog-
nize that acting in one of the foregoing capacities is now
recognized as a business or as a legitimate basis for receiv-
ing reasonable compensation. Following that view, the ap-
pellate court in the case of In re Edwards' Estate62 has now
59 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 135. The former Guardian and Ward Act, ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 64, § 43, and the Lunatics, Idiots, Spendthrifts and Drunkards
Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 86, § 36, provided that guardians and conservators
should be allowed "reasonable compensation for their services."
60 27 III. 37 (1861).
61 IM. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 490. The former provision, fixing maximum fees
of six per cent and three per cent was eliminated, probably because the presence
of the six per cent rule in the statute tended to detract attention from the reason-
ableness of the fees sought. The result of the former law often was that in some
estates, particularly the larger ones, fees of six per cent of the amount of the
personal estate were charged when that figure was unreasonably high, while in
other estates, six per cent was often inadequate compensation. The flexible provi-
sion for reasonable compensation in the new act makes "reasonableness" the sole
question in each case.
62 312 II. App. 645, 39 N.E. (2d) 72 (1942).
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definitely overruled the doctrine expressed in the Willard
case and has recognized instead that, because of the change
which has taken place in the character of estates and in the
additional duties and obligations now imposed on the exe-
cutor or administrator, he is entitled to have reasonable com-
pensation for the services he renders and the duties and
obligations he assumes. The case is also interesting because
it holds that the duty does not devolve upon the executor or
administrator to show the number of hours spent in each
activity, as would be the case of a master in chancery itemiz-
ing his fees, and that, if any interested party desires to
question the testimony as to the total amount of time neces-
sarily spent, he must do so by cross-examination or by
other testimony.6
Section 337 of the Probate Act, 64 relating to attorney's fees
for the attorney of the executor, provides that the attorney
shall be allowed reasonable compensation for his services.
It will be observed that this language closely parallels that
of Section 336 dealing with executor's fees, so it would be
safe to assume that what the court said in the Edwards case
will be equally applicable when it is called upon to construe
the section dealing with attorney's fees.
In the case of Bley v. Luebeck,65 the court had occasion to
determine what evidence is admissible under the Probate
Act in the county or probate court, or in the circuit court on
appeal, where it is sought to establish a lost will. It was
held that the nisi prius court is required to pass upon the
issues of loss or destruction of the will and whether it was in
existence at the time of the testator's death and had not been
revoked by him during his lifetime and that, for these pur-
poses, either party had the right to offer evidence on these
issues. In arriving at this decision, the court recognized that
Sections 69 and 71 of the Probate Act, 6 dealing with the
testimony which may be offered where the will is in exist-
63 Schedules of fees are published by trust companies. These schedules, the
court indicates, in and of themselves, prove nothing, unless they purport to be
based upon services actually rendered in -a given case and can be shown to
represent the reasonable, usual and customary fees for the services so rendered.
64 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 491.
65 377 Ill. 50, 35 N.E. (2d) 334 (1941).
66 I. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, H 221 and 223.
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ence, restricts the issues before the court in the first in-
stance to questions relating to the execution of the will, the
sanity of the testator, and the possibility of fraud, forgery,
compulsion or other improper conduct which might be suffi-
cient to destroy the will. It was held, however, that these
sections do not control the nature and extent of the evidence
which may be offered when the court is required to pass on
the issues of loss or destruction of the will. Such decision is
obviously in accord with the intention of the legislature. The
rule announced prevailed before the passage of the present
act 7 and there is nothing in Sections 69 and 71 to indicate
that the legislature intended in any manner to change the
law with respect to the proof of lost wills.
The status of a conservator, upon the death of the ward,
received consideration by the Supreme Court in the case of
Hire v. Hrudicka.68 In that case, a citation proceeding to
discover assets had been commenced by a conservator and
an order had been entered directing the respondent to turn
over certain funds. The respondent appealed to the circuit
court, and, when the matter came on for hearing, filed a
motion to abate the proceeding on the ground that the ward
had died. Such motion was predicated on the ground that
since the ward was the real party in interest, the conservator
had no power to proceed with the suit. The court sustained
the motion, and its decision was affirmed by the appellate
court. In reversing, the Supreme Court, after pointing out
that the case was governed by the Probate Act, compared
the provision contained in the former law relating to the
conservator's settlement of the deceased ward's estate69
with the corresponding provision in the new act.71 It found
that the only difference in the two acts is that the present one
is a little more clear and specific and shortens the time to
thirty days for the filing of an application for the appoint-
ment of an administrator. It therefore stated: "In any event
there is a proper party appellant in this case-i.e., Bessie L.
67 The earlier decisions and statutes are correlated and reviewed in the opinion
in Bley v. Luebeck, 377 IIl. 50, 35 N.E. (2d) 334 (1941).
68 379 Ill. 201, 40 N.E. (2d) 63 (1942), reversing (sub nom. In re Hire's Estate)
309 Ill. App. 566, 33 N.E. (2d) 652 (1941).
69 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 86, § 9.
70 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 476.
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Hire, conservatrix and ex officio administratrix of the estate
of Herman R. Hire, deceased, a party fully competent and
qualified under the law to prosecute this litigation to an end,'' 71
and remanded the cause with directions to overrule the
motion and to proceed with the cause.
The decision indicates that upon the death of the ward,
without any affirmative action on the part of the conservator
or the court, the conservator by operation of law, becomes
ex-officio administrator. Assuming this to be true, there then
arise several interesting questions. Under the Probate Act,
the "claim date" is automatically fixed in a decedent's es-
tate.72 Also, under that act, the surviving spouse is allowed
a period of time within which to perfect a right of dower. 73
As a consequence, the following problems are presented:
1. Does a claim date occur by operation of law under the Probate Act
when an incompetent or a minor dies and the guardian or conservator
becomes ex-officio administrator?
2. If so, would it be the first Monday in the second month following the
month in which the ward died, or would it be the first Monday in the
second month following the month in which the thirty-day period for the
appointment of an administrator expired?
3. When would the time commence to run for the surviving spouse to
perfect his or her right of dower in real estate owned by the deceased
ward?
These questions existed to a greater or lesser extent under
the former laws, and were not created by the passage of the
Probate Act. The decision does, however, suggest the advis-
ability of suitable amendment of the act to clarify these
problems.
In Fleming v. Yeaze174 the Supreme Court considered the
right of the executor of a will to deduct from the share due
a legatee the amount of a note executed by the legatee where
suit on the note was barred by the statute of limitations. The
court held that where the will evidences an intention to di-
vide an estate equally and there is nothing to show an in-
tention to cancel notes owed by certain legatees, which notes
had been given for money borrowed from the testatrix, de-
71 379 Ill. 201 at 207, 40 N.E. (2d) 63 at 66.
72 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, C. 3, § 346.
73 IU. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 171.
74 379 IlM. 343, 40 N.E. (2d) 507 (1942), noted in 20 cHICAGO-KENT LAw REv w 277.
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duction of the amounts so due from the shares of such
legatees is proper even though suit thereon might be other-
wise barred. The court predicated its decision very largely
upon the equitable principle that "no one should be permit-
ted to share in a fund until he has discharged his obligation
to contribute to that fund. ' 7 In so deciding, the court settled
a question which apparently has never before been directly
passed upon in this state.
The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the subject
of demonstrative legacies in Lenzen v. Miller78 in which
case it definitely recognized these legacies, thereby bring-
ing Illinois into line with the great majority of states. Certain
rules of construction, for the purpose of determining whether
the language used by the testator creates a demonstrative
legacy or not, were there laid down. Thus it was said
that the first inclination of the courts is to hold legacies to
be general or demonstrative rather than specific, and that
to make a legacy specific the terms employed must clearly
require such a construction. Another rule requires that the
testamentary intention, which the courts will carry into
effect, must be that expressed by the language of the will
to be ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the
testator. Evidence of these circumstances may be received,
but they cannot be permitted to import into the will an in-
tention different from that expressed by its language. The
hardships arising from the use of specific legacies have
long been condemned and, it would appear, have now been
instrumental in persuading the court to recognize demon-
strative legacies.
Section 11 of the new Probate Act,77 dealing with the de-
scent of real and personal estate, was construed in part in
Dial v. Dial.78 The former Descent Act79 and the Dower
Act 0 gave to the surviving spouse, where there were no de-
scendants of the decedent but there was a surviving parent,
75 379 11. 343 at 346, 40 N.E. (2d) 507 at 508.
76 378 Ill. 170, 37 N.E. (2d) 833 (1941), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 189.
77 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 162.
78 378 IRl. 276, 38 N.E. (2d) 43 (1941), noted in 20 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REviEw 179,
30 Il1. B. J. 375.
79 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 39, § 1, sub-sec. 3a.
80 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 41, § 1.
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brother or sister, one-half of the real estate in fee and a
dower interest in the remaining half. The new act, how-
ever, changed this rule and allows such surviving spouse,
at least so far as the real estate is concerned, only one-half
of each parcel of real estate of which the decedent died
siezed and in which the surviving spouse does not perfect
his or her right to dower in the manner provided in Section
19 thereof.8' The change so affected was recognized by the
court, which held that the surviving spouse was entitled to
one-half of the real estate in fee and the other relatives were
entitled to the remaining one-half free and clear of any claim
to dower therein. The court further considered the meaning
of the words "died siezed" as used in such statute, and held
that these words were not used by the legislature in their
technical sense but rather were to be treated as if the word
"owned" had been used.
The appellate court had occasion, in In re Gilbert's Estate,82
to construe Sections 74 and 77 of the former Administration
Act. Section 77 thereof had provided, in part, that:
When the person dying is, at the time of his or her death, a housekeeper,
the head of a family, and leaves no widow or surviving husband, there
shall be allowed to the children of the deceased, residing with him or her
at the time of his or her death (including all males under eighteen years
of age, and all females), the same amount of property, and money, sub-
ject to the review of the court as provided in Section 75, is allowed to
the widow for herself and children by this Act .... 83
The court concluded that, under such statute, an unmarried
daughter who lived with her widowed father in a suite in an
apartment hotel was not entitled to a child's award. Sec-
tion 179 of the Probate Act84 likewise uses the words "resid-
ing with" when referring to female children of the decedent
over twenty-one years of age. It may well be that the con-
struction placed on these words in the Gilbert case may be
helpful in construing their meaning. It should, however, be
noted that this section does not retain the former require-
ment that the decedent shall be "a housekeeper, the head
81 IM. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 162, sub-sec. 3, and § 171.
82 311 IlM. App. 28, 35 N.E. (2d) 400 (1941), noted in 30 IMI. B. J. 209.
83 Il. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, §§ 75 and 78.
84 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, §§ 330-1.
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of a family" so it is possible that the words may be more
liberally construed than was the case under the former law.
VII. PUBLIC LAW
CONFLICT OF LAWS
The enforcement of rights and obligations arising under
the laws of other jurisdictions has been given consideration
by our courts during the past year. Thus, the Appellate Court
for the Second District has decided that the decree for ali-
mony rendered in another state can now be enforced in Illi-
nois by appropriate equitable action, both as to past due and
future installments. In the case of Rule v. Rule' the com-
plaint asked enforcement of a Nevada divorce decree which
provided for alimony payable in weekly installments. The
trial court entered a decree substantially following the terms
of the Nevada decree, but providing that should the Nevada
court modify its decree a corresponding modification might
be had in Illinois. The Appellate Court, emphasizing its
freedom of choice in view of the fact that the case was one of
first impression, adopted the rule "that a divorce decree in
one State can be established as a foreign decree and en-
forced" in the local courts. The court said that the principles
of equity and justice were better served than by adopting
the rule followed in many states that a decree for alimony
can be enforced only through the medium of an action at law
for past due installments. The question of whether a decree
must be enforced as to future installments under the "full
faith and credit" clause has not been passed upon by the
Supreme Court of the United States.2 The court in the in-
stant case relied on decisions from Mississippi, Iowa, Cali-
fornia, South Carolina, Washington, Oregon and Oklahoma,
while noting that a contrary result had been reached in
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, and the
District of Columbia. The view taken, if adopted by the Illi-
nois Supreme Court, will greatly facilitate the enforcement
of the obligation of support for the divorced wife and chil-
dren, a problem magnified by the modern tendency to move
1 313 IIl. App. 108, 39 N.E. (2d) 379 (1942), noted in 30 Ill. B. J. 376.
2 See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 682, 54 L. Ed. 905 (1910).
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from state to state. It is to be hoped that the case is indicative
of a tendency toward a more liberal attitude on the problem
of enforcement of equitable decrees generally.
Another decision of interest involved the enforcement of an
attorney's lien where a settlement of the claim had been
reached and made the basis of a judgment in the courts of
another state. In McCallum v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company,3 a resident of Indiana employed by the defendant
was killed in that state while in the course of his employment.
His wife and executrix employed an attorney who filed suit
in Indiana against the defendant. While this suit was pending,
she employed a Chicago attorney to represent her in the
prosecution of her claim. This attorney gave notice to de-
fendant of his claim for a lien in accordance with the Illinois
statute. Subsequently, a settlement was concluded between
the executrix and the defendant. She was represented by
her Indiana attorneys in the making of this settlement, one
of the terms of which was that the matter should be con-
cluded by a hearing and the entry of a judgment in the suit
pending in Indiana. At the instance of the defendant, the
Indiana court impounded the money until there could be a
settlement of the claims of the attorneys. The court fixed
a date for hearing on these claims and the Chicago attorney
was duly notified. He did not appear to establish his claim,
and the Indiana court held it invalid. In accordance with
the court's order, the amount of the judgment was paid to
the executrix. The Chicago attorney thereupon filed his action
in Illinois to collect the amount of his fee from the defendant
carrier. Plaintiff appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court after
a judgment for the defendant had been affirmed by the
appellate court.' The Supreme Court, relying on the theory
that the Indiana proceedings were, in nature, quasi in rem,
upheld the judgment for the defendant.
A dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Farthing took the posi-
tion that, under the Illinois cases, an attorney's lien does not
attach to the sum paid over or paid into court but merely
imposes upon the person liable to pay the same, the duty of
8 379 IMl. 60, 39 N.E. (2d) 340 (1942).
4 310 IDI. App. 189, 33 N.E. (2d) 920 (1941).
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withholding a sum sufficient to meet the claim. Assuming
this view to be correct, it is difficult to see how the Indiana
court obtained jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff's claim.
The situation suggests an analogy to interpleader proceed-
ings. Where several persons claim the same debt, it has
been held that the interpleader court cannot determine
the conflicting claims unless all the claimants are person-
ally before the court. Payment of the amount of the
debt into court does not convert the action into one quasi in
rem.5 The federal Interpleader Act" recognizes this princi-
ple. Moreover, in the instant case, it would seem that the
several claims for attorney's fees were independent of each
other, being based upon separate contracts. The majority
opinion relies heavily upon the fact that defendant could not
protect itself in any other way than by attempting to get the
Indiana court to settle the entire matter.
The Supreme Court has reversed the appellate deci-
sion7 in the case of Peirce v. Peirce,' noted last year. The
controversy there concerned conflicting claims to administer
the estate of a decedent. Peirce, domiciled in Illinois at the
time of his death, had gone through a ceremonial marriage
in Mexico before a divorce had been granted terminating
his first marriage. One child had been born of the first union,
four were born of the second. Peirce and his second wife
spent the year after their marriage in Mexico, Cuba, and
New York. They lived in Texas for six years, and finally re-
turned to Illinois. Peirce left his second wife in Illinois while
he went to seek business opportunities in the west. While in
Nevada he filed suit for divorce against his first wife, but
that court granted her a divorce on her cross-bill. Peirce's
second wife then joined him in Nevada and they lived there
as husband and wife for about one month after the divorce
had been granted. They thereafter returned to Illinois and
so remained until Peirce's death. The appellate court had
held that, since the parties were domiciled in Illinois at the
5 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518, 36 S. Ct. 613, 60 L. Ed. 1140
(1916).
6 28 U. S. C. A. § 41(26).
7 Sub nor. In re Peirce's Estate, 310 IMl. App. 481, 34 N.E. (2d) 564 (1941) noted
in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvigw 80.
8 379 III. 185, 39 N.E. (2d) 990 (1942).
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time of the divorce, no common law marriage could be recog-
nized. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that there was
insufficient evidence to establish an Illinois domicile at the
time of the divorce and, therefore, the parties were to be
regarded as being domiciled in Nevada. Under the laws of
that state, where parties attempt a valid marriage, the fact
of cohabitation with matrimonial intent, after removal of
the disability, will give rise to a valid marriage. The opinion
stresses the fact that the real question concerned the legiti-
macy of the children rather than the validity of the marriage.
It may be that Illinois public policy prevents the recogni-
tion of a common law marriage contracted elsewhere, but
it does not prevent the recognition of a marriage status so
far as the legitimacy of children is concerned. While in-
tent is of importance in determining domicile, the court
does not elaborate upon the evidence which induced it to
reach a different conclusion from that reached by the inter-
mediate appellate tribunal.
Two other cases are deserving of passing mention. In
Campbell v. Albers 9 the court held that an equity court in
Illinois had jurisdiction to determine the liabilities of trus-
tees under a testamentary trust created by the will of a per-
son whose domicile at the time of death was in Idaho,
despite the fact that an Idaho statute apparently reserved
jurisdiction to the probate courts of that state in cases of
testamentary trusts arising out of estates administered
there. In the second, that of Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick
Company,1" the Illinois Statute of Frauds was held to be
substantive and not procedural, so the court held that the
statute in force where the contract is made determines the
formal validity thereof. The ruling follows the prevailing
view and the opinion does not attempt a discussion of the
function of the substance-procedure distinction.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The case involving a constitutional question which at-
tracted the widest attention during the year was City of
9 313 IIl. App. 152, 39 N.E. (2d) 672 (1942).
10 311 IM. App. 111, 35 N.E. (2d) 522 (1941).
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Blue Island v. Kozul.11 In this case, the defendant, a mem-
ber of the Jehovah's Witnesses, was convicted for the viola-
tion of a municipal ordinance which forbade peddling on
the city streets without a license. The defendant had been
selling and giving away certain religious magazines. The
Supreme Court held that, as applied to defendant's activi-
ties, the ordinance interfered with freedom of speech and of
the press and violated both the state and federal consti-
tutions. Principal reliance was placed upon recent decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lovell v. City
of Griffin2 and Schneider v. Irvington.3 The court refused
to distinguish these cases on the ground that a tax was here
involved, instead of censorship through licensing, holding
that fredom of the press was involved in either event. The
argument that the ordinance involved only a valid police
regulation of the use of the city streets with a reasonable
charge to defray expenses was rejected with the observa-
tion that the ordinance contained no provision relative to
the manner in which licensees were to conduct their busi-
nesses. The decision is of interest in view of subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States uphold-
ing similar ordinances, 4 which decisions have been exten-
sively criticized. 15
In Daly v. County of Madison6 the old question of judi-
cial interference to compel a redistricting of the state for
election purposes was again before the Supreme Court. A
petition had there been filed under the act relating to suits
by taxpayers to restrain the disbursement of public mon-
eys 7 asking leave to file a complaint to enjoin the expendi-
ture of funds for holding the primary and general elections
in 1942. The basis of the complaint was that the 1901 Congres-
11 379 Ill. 511, 41 N.E. (2d) 515 (1942).
12 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938).
18 308 U. S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155 (1939).
14 Jones v. City of Opelika, - U. S. -, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1174 (1942), with
which case was consolidated Bowden and Sanders v. City of Fort Smith, and
Jobin v. Arizona.
15 These cases are discussed in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvmw 349, as is also the
principal case.
16 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E. (2d) 160 (1941).
1T Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 102, 1§ 11-7.
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sional Apportionment Act" was void due to changes in popu-
lation in the several districts thereby created. The circuit
court denied the petition and the Supreme Court affirmed
that decision. The opinion by Mr. Justice Smith stressed the
lack of power in the equity court to interfere with elections
and the usual refusal to deal with political questions. In re-
sponse to the argument that the statute had changed the
equity rule and gave the taxpayer a right to sue, the court
held that the statute was intended to limit and not to enlarge
the jurisdiction of the equity courts. The opinion did, how-
ever, discuss the merits of the controversy to a consider-
able extent. Federal law and the Fourteenth Amendment
were said not to impose upon the states the duty of creating
districts equal in population. The petitioner relied upon a
number of cases in the United States Supreme Court in
which legislation initially valid had become invalid in the
course of time due to changed conditions. But it was pointed
out that these cases involved either emergency legislation
or the exercise of the police power, and were, therefore,
inapplicable to the present problem.
Separation of powers was likewise the basis for holding
that the provisions of the Judges Retirement System Act
relating to refunds 9 were unconstitutional. 20 The other pro-
visions of the act which provided for a system of voluntary
participation in a pension plan were upheld as constitutional.
In holding the refund provisions invalid, the court pointed
out that the act did not state the terms and conditions upon
which refunds were to be made. If this was left to be deter-
mined by the trustees, there was an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power.
Two other cases deserve mention. Difficulties with spe-
cial assessments and the bonds issued against them appear
in the recent holding2' that an ordinance allowing a bond-
holder to exchange his special assessment bonds for others
identical except for denomination impairs the obligation of
the bonds held by others. Under Illinois decisions, the special
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 46, § 154-6.
19 Il. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 37, § 441.6, § 441.7, §441.11(b), and § 441.18.
20 People ex rel. v. Wright, 379 Ill. 328, 40 N.E. (2d) 719 (1942).
21 Murray v. Village of Skokie, 379 Il. 112, 39 N.E. (2d) 671 (1941).
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assessments, when collected, are trust funds for the dis-
charge of the bonds issued against them. A modification of
denomination and the use of the bonds to discharge the
holder's own assessment impairs the contract right of other
holders to participate rateably in the distribution of moneys
collected.
In Lasdon v. Hallihan22 the court held Section 5 of the
Dental Practice Act" to be a valid exercise of the police
power. This section included in the definition of practicing
dentistry the furnishing of full or partial dentures to the
general public. A proviso made the section inapplicable to
those who furnished dentures only to practicing dentists. The
reasonableness of the statutory restrictions against adver-
tising by dentists was pointed out, and the court held that
the legislature might extend these restrictions to persons
engaged in the business of furnishing artificial teeth, since
the evils attendant upon commercialization of the profession
could not otherwise be prevented.
A recent case, that of Clark v. Quick,24 involving the con-
struction of the Absent Voters Law,25 may be noted here
although it does not determine any constitutional question.
It appeared from the facts of that case that several absentee
ballots in an election for county clerk were handed by the
voters to an official of a political organization instead of
being mailed or delivered to the proper public official. The
political officer retained the ballots for a time and then
delivered them or mailed them to the county clerk. The
Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances, these
ballots were void since the statutory requirements had to be
construed as being mandatory and not directory, even
though there was no evidence that any of the ballots had
been tampered with. Mr. Justice Smith dissented, taking
the view that since the failure to comply with the statute did
not affect the result of the election, the court should not
adopt a view which would disenfranchise these voters. 26
22 377 Il. 187, 36 N.E. (2d) 227 (1941).
23 111. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 91, 1 60.
24 377 11. 424, 36 N.E. (2d) 563 (1941).
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 46, § 462 et seq.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Cases of substantial importance in the law of Municipal
Corporations were decided during the past year. Fieldcrest
Dairies, Inc. v. City of Chicago2 involved the validity of a
city ordinance regulating the distribution of milk under
which the plaintiff, a Michigan corporation engaged in de-
livering milk in the Chicago area, had been denied a permit
to market milk in paper containers. Suit in the federal dis-
trict court to secure a favorable interpretation of the ordi-
nance, or in the alternative to have the same declared in-
valid, had resulted in a decision that the city could regu-
late the sale of milk but that portions of the ordinance in
question were invalid because they conflicted with a state
statute on the subject. The city was, therefore, enjoined
from enforcing the ordinance pending review of the decision
by the United States Supreme Court.28 It should be a matter
of judicial notice that the sale of milk in paper containers
has leaped in geometrical progression since the decision.
While the reviewing court will, undoubtedly, be concerned
with a problem of statutory construction viewed legalistical-
ly, both the public interest and economic concern may be
factors in the final decision. Although the Illinois Milk Sta-
tute" and a decision thereunder 0 permit a municipality to
insist upon more rigorous regulation than the minimum
standards fixed by the statute, still the whims of a munici-
pality should not be permitted to block progress in the safe
and economical distribution of milk.8'
A question of tort liability was involved in Anderson v.
City of Chicago.2 It appeared that the plaintiff therein was
an onlooker but not a participant in a clash between striking
workers and the municipal police. During the rout of the
27 122 F. (2d) 132 (1941), modifying 35 F. Supp. 451 (1940), noted in 36 Ill. L. Rev.
578, 30 IM. B. J. 257.
28 Petition for certiorari was granted: 314 U. S. 604, 62 S. Ct. 301, 86 L. Ed. 145
(1941). The United States Supreme Court later vacated the judgment and re-
manded the cause to the District Court to await the outcome of proceedings
brought in the state court to test the constitutionality of the ordinance in question:
Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, - U. S. -, 62 S. Ct. 986, 86 L. Ed. 888 (1942).
29 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 561h, §§ 152-69.
80 Kizer v. City of Mattoon, 332 Il. 545, 164 N.E. 20 (1928).
31 See note in 36 II. L. Rev. 578.
82 313 Ill. App. 616, 40 N.E. (2d) 601 (1942).
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strikers, the plaintiff was felled by a bullet and overtaken
by policemen, who then beat and kicked him mercilessly in
the apparent belief that he was a striker. On jury trial, a
verdict and judgment was returned in plaintiff's favor, but
on appeal it was held that the melee in which the plaintiff
was injured was not caused by a "mob" and that, therefore,
the city could not be held liable under the terms of the per-
tinent statute."3 The court deemed that the intention of the
legislature was to impose a duty upon municipalities to pre-
vent mobs from arrogating to themselves the powers given
by the state to the municipalities, but since the plaintiff was
not the object of the strikers' action, even if they could be
said in popular language to be a mob, recovery was denied.
Injuries inflicted by the police, which was all that the plain-
tiff's evidence tended to show, were regarded as falling
within the recognized immunity accorded to instrumental-
ities exercising the powers of the state.
In Boehne v. Board of Trustees Firemen's Pension Fund34
the appellate court was asked to construe certain sections
of the Firemen's Pension Act."5 It was held that Section 7
thereof was surplusage, that Section 636 covered all cases
otherwise coming under either Sections 5 or 737 insofar as
the widow and child of a deceased pensioner were concerned,
and, consequently, that where a pensioner remarried after
retirement, his widow and the child of that marriage were
not entitled to a continuation of the benefits provided by the
pension fund.38
Municipal control over streets and alleys39 has been con-
sidered elsewhere in connection with the use thereof by pub-
lic utilities, 4 but one case dealing with the right to permit
the use thereof for switch track purposes should be con-
sidered. In Greenlee Foundry Company v. Borin Art Prod-
ucts Corporation41 the court held that it was improper to
33 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 512.
34 313 II. App. 291, 40 N.E. (2d) 94 (1942).
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 918.
36 Ibid. § 923. 37 Ibid. § 922 and 924.
38 Remarriage before retirement is covered by Ill. Rev. Stat 1941, Ch. 24, § 923.
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 69-1 et seq.
40 See discussion of Geneseo case in section dealing with Public Utilities.
41 379 Ill. 494, 41 N.E. (2d) 532 (1942), noted in 20 CHIcAGo-KENT LAw REViEw 366.
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grant such use to a private industry, even though others
might later wish to connect with the tracks so laid.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
During the period covered by this survey the Supreme
Court of Illinois rendered two decisions of tremendous im-
portance in the field of public utility law. In the first of these,
that of City of Geneseo v. Illinois Northern Utilities Com-
pany,2 the court in effect held that when a municipal fran-
chise granted to a utility has expired, the city has the right
to compel the utility occupying its streets to remove its
properties therefrom. In reaching this decision the court said
that the problem before it was principally one of statutory
construction to determine whether or not the Public Utili-
ties Act" had withdrawn from the cities and vested in the
Illinois Commerce Commission the power otherwise given
to cities by the Cities and Villages Act" to control the pres-
ence of utilities in municipal streets. It decided the former
statute had not withdrawn this power.
Exactly the contrary conclusion had been reached by the
court in 1936, in a case between the same parties.4" There
the city had sought a mandatory injunction to compel the
removal of the utility property pursuant to an ouster ordin-
ance passed by the city at the expiration of the franchise.
The utility company answered that the Public Utilities Act
had removed from the cities, including plaintiff, the power
to control the presence of utilities in the streets and had
placed that power in the commission. Plaintiff's motion to
strike the answer was allowed. An appeal was taken directly
to the Illinois Supreme Court for the reason that the validity
of an ordinance was involved. Finding the ordinance invalid
42 378 Ill. 506, 39 N.E. (2d) 26 (1941), Stone, J., and Shaw, J., dissented. The
case of the Village of Heyworth v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co., involving
the same principle and to which the point of res adjudicata was equally applicable,
was consolidated with the instant case. Certiorari was denied by the United States
Supreme Court, - U. S. -, 62 S. Ct. 1046, 86 L. Ed. 937 (1942). See also note in
30 Ill. B. J. 255.
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 111-2/3.
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24.
45 City of Geneseo v. Illinois Northern Utilities Co., 363 Ill. 89, 1 N. E. (2d) 392
(1936).
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on the ground that the act in question had removed munic-
ipal power over utilities located in its streets, the Supreme
Court reversed the decision with directions that the motion
be overruled. Pursuant to the mandate, judgment on the an-
swer was entered for the defendant.
Following that decision, proceedings were instituted be-
fore the commission, which found that public convenience
and necessity did not demand the removal of the utility
properties. On appeal to the circuit court, this finding was
affirmed. The case again reaching the Illinois Supreme
Court, the latter did not discuss the commission's findings
as to convenience and necessity, but re-examined the statu-
tory question it had once before decided. In overruling the
prior Geneseo decision, a re-examination of which would
seem to have been barred by the doctrine of res adjudicata,46
the decision sets aside principles heretofore recognized in
a long series of decisions construing the Public Utilities
Act. 47
Mr. Justice Stone, who had dissented in the Chicago Mo-
tor Coach Company case" and in the prior Geneseo case49
on the ground that the Public Utilities Act had not removed
the power of cities to control the presence of utilities in their
streets, dissented in the instant case pointing out that, while
he had previously disagreed on the question of statutory
construction, the rule announced therein had become well
settled, was known to the legislature, and had been acqui-
esced in by it. He said that a change, therefore, was within
"the province of the General Assembly, and not of this
court."50 He referred also to the tremendous investments
made by the public in utility securities in reliance on the
46This point was urged by the utility company. Had the decision rested on the
question of convenience and necessity, such plea would have been inapposite.
The first opinion in the instant case was filed April 10, 1941. It expressly overruled
the prior Geneseo decision. In the petition for rehearing, the point of res
adjudicata was strongly urged. Rehearing was granted, but the second opinion
avoided the doctrine by stating that the basis of the prior case was not plain.
47 See Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22, 66
A. L. R. 834 (1929), and cases therein cited. See also cases listed in 363 Ill. 89 at
95, 1 N.E. (2d) 392 at 394.
48 See note 47 ante.
49 See note 45 ante.
50 378 Ill. 506 at 535, 39 N.E. (2d) 26 at 40.
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prior rule all of which, by the decision, were subjected to
drastic shrinkage in value.
In the other decision, that of Inter-State Water Company
v. City of Danville,51 the court held that a city has the right
under Section 68 of the Public Utilities Act 2 to appeal from
an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission increasing
the domestic and industrial rates of utility customers with-
in the city, although the rates charged the city itself were
not increased. It was pointed out that Sections 64 to 66 of
the act" contemplate a participation by municipalities in
commission proceedings where "rates or other charges or
services of public utilities within such" municipalities are
involved and that it would, therefore, be absurd to conclude
that a city had no right to appeal from the decision in such
proceedings, particularly where the right of appeal was
given to "any person . . affected by the order of the
Commission." The case squarely presented to the court for
the first time the issue decided by it.
TAXATION
Several interesting points under the Chicago budget law54
relating to the listing of assets and liabilities of cities as the
basis for taxation were settled in People ex rel. Toman v.
B. Mercil & Sons Plating Company.55 Among other things, the
court decided that the listing among the current assets of a
sum as to which a judgment had been rendered in favor of
the city but from which judgment an appeal had been taken
so that it was clear that the judgment, even if sustained,
could not be collected during the taxable year, was proper.
The listing of estimated revenue from the licensing of pari-
mutuel brokers was likewise regarded as proper, the court
saying: "Corporate authorities, in making their estimates,
are not required to take the risk of having an appropriation
held invalid by omitting estimated revenue because they
fear the authority authorizing it may be voided.... "56 The
51 379 Mll. 41, 39 N.E. (2d) 356 (1942).
52 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 111-2/3, § 72.
53 Ibid., §§ 68-70.
54 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 22-1 et seq.
55 378 Ill. 142, 37 N.E. (2d) 839 (1941).
56 378 IM. 142 at 148, 37 N.E. (2d) 839 at 844.
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inclusion of certain items as liabilities, such as accounts
payable and unvouchered bills, was deemed proper although
these liabilities had been incurred in the past and were to be
paid out of prior levies, the court stating:
There is nothing in the Budget law requiring the city to determine whether
it can pay a liability with tax money after it is collected, nor is there any-
thing requiring it to decide whether a prior debt can be paid out of a
prior tax, when collected... Whether the accounts payable have become
void by reason of not having been paid out of current revenue is not for
us to determine in this proceding. 57
It was determined, in People ex Tel. Larson v. Thomp-
son, 8 that while the failure to publish an appropriation ordi-
nance within ten days from its adoption does not render it
void, the enactment of a levy ordinance within ten days of
the date that the appropriation ordinance is finally pub-
lished, operates to void the levy ordinance.
Three cases involving alleged discriminations under the
general property tax law were before the Supreme Court
and the results indicate that the case of a taxpayer seeking
relief on this ground is still hard. In the first of these, that of
People v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 9 the de-
fendant had paid some but not all of the taxes assessed
against its personal property. It took the position that the
board of review, which had made an order decreasing real
estate values in general by twenty per cent. for the purpose
of taxation, had in fact employed an equalization factor of
thirty per cent: and that it should have applied the same factor
to personalty. The court found that the board had not changed
the equalization factor but had simply reduced the assess-
ment of real estate, which it had power to do under the
statutes. As to such debasement, the court said that the
requirement of uniformity" went only to "property of like
kind and character"'" and that it did not apply as between
distinct classes of property. Justices Stone and Smith dis-
sented on the ground that it appeared from the stipulation of
57 378 M. 142 at 152, 37 N.E. (2d) 839 at 845.
58 377 Ill. 104, 35 N.E. (2d) 355 (1941), noted in 36 Ill. L. Rev. 689.
59 377 IMl. 303, 36 N.E. (2d) 362 (1941), noted in 36 IMl. L.. Rev. 796 and 30 III.
B. J. 300.
6o M11. Const. 1870, Art. 9, § 1.
61 377 Ill. 303 at 306, 36 N.E. (2d) 362 at 364.
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facts that the board had reduced the equalization factor as
to real estate and that it should similarly have reduced it as
to personalty. Justice Murphy separately dissented on the
ground that Article 9, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution62
required uniformity as between classes of property in debas-
ing assessed valuation as well as in applying an equalization
factor.
In the second case, Tuttle v. Bell, 3 some 158 individual
farmers in a suit brought to enjoin the county treasurer
from collecting a portion of the taxes levied against their
real estate, alleged that the assessed value of farm lands
had been fixed at thirty-five per cent of their fair cash value,
while city property had been fixed at twenty-five per cent of
such value. They attempted to show this by the reports
of three different surveys, one made under the supervision
of the State Tax Commission, which relied on data obtained
from studying eighty voluntary sales of farm lands and two
hundred twenty-nine voluntary sales of city property. It
did not appear that the lands of any of the plaintiffs were
among those checked by the surveys; 4 nor did it appear
that they were similar to any of the lands so checked. The
court pointed out that the gist of the plaintiffs' claim was
that their property should be relieved from a part of the
taxes levied for the reason that other real estate was not
assessed high enough. In dismissing the suit for want of
equity, the court said: "A court of equity will not grant
injunctive relief under such circumstances."6 5
In the third case, that of People ex rel. Toman v. Pickard,e6
plaintiff, as owner of unimproved real estate, claimed that
the assessor had debased the full value of buildings on
improved land by thirty per cent. before applying the
equalization factor but that in valuing unimproved real es-
tate there had been no similar debasement in value. This,
the taxpayer claimed, violated the rule of uniformity. The
62 That section reads: " . . .every person .. . shall pay a tax in proportion to
the value of his ... property. ... "
63 377 Ill. 510, 37 N.E. (2d) 180 (1941).
64 What effect, if any, the inclusion of some of the lands belonging to the several
plaintiffs among those checked would have had is speculative.
65 377 Ill. 510 at 514, 37 N.E. (2d) 180 at 182.
66 377 Ill. 610, 37 N.E. (2d) 330 (1941).
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court found, however, that the evidence did show that the
value of buildings had been determined by taking reproduc-
tion cost new, less thirty per cent. because of lack of market-
ability, less depreciation and obsolescence. The taxpayer, it
said, had no right to have unimproved real estate valued by
the same method.
The most striking changes and decisions during the period
of this survey are found under the Retailers' Occupation Tax
Act. 7 Section 6 thereof6 8 formerly contained broad refund
provisions,69 as a consequence of which many retailers who
had passed on their tax burden to consumers were in a
position to come into a windfall in the event the tax had
been improperly assessed against them. To correct this situa-
tion, Section 6 was amended and it now provides that no
credit shall be allowed or refund made unless it shall appear:
(a) that the claimant bore the burden of such amount and has not been
relieved thereof nor reimbursed therefor and has not shifted such burden
directly or indirectly through inclusion of such amount in the price of
the tangible personal property sold by him or in any manner whatsoever;
and that no understanding or agreement written or oral, exists whereby
he may be relieved of the burden of such amount, be reimbursed there-
for or may shift the burden thereof; or
(b) that he has repaid unconditionally such amount to his vendee (1) who
bore the burden thereof (2) who has not been relieved thereof nor reim-
bursed therefor, and has not shifted such burden directly or indirectly and
(3) who is not entitled to receive any reimbursement therefor from any
other source, or to be relieved of such burden in any manner whatso-
ever. 70
In thus attempting to close the gates to windfalls, the legis-
lature has done more since it would seem that if a vendor,
having paid an illegal tax, has passed on his tax burden
even contingently to a protesting purchaser, the chances of
recovering to make the purchaser whole are slight.
Problems involving the application of the amended section
to existing claims have already arisen. In Peoples Store of
67 I1. Rev. Stat. 1941, CI. 120, § 440 et seq.
68 Ibid. § 445.
69 It provided simply that if it appeared that a tax payment had been erron-
eously made "whether as the result of a mistake of fact or an error of law," then
the person who made the erroneous payment could obtain a tax credit or refund:
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 445. Under this section, it was held that the Director
of Finance could be compelled by mandamus to issue a credit memorandum in a
proper case: People v. McKibbin, 377 Ill. 22, 35 N.E. (2d) 321 (1941).
70 M. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 120, § 445.
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Roseland v. McKibbin71 it was held that it should apply to a
case on appeal before the Supreme Court at the time the
amendment went into effect. In People ex rel. Allied Bridge
& Construction Company v. McKibbin,72 however, it was
held that it did not apply where refund rights had already
become vested in a claimant by an unappealed decree direct-
ing the issuance of a credit memorandum.
Section 1 of the act 73 was also amended, following the
decisions exempting contractors from the application of the
act,7 so as to define a contractor's function as a use. The
amended portion reads:
"Use or consumption," in addition to its usual and popular meaning, shall
be construed to include the employment of tangible personal property by
persons engaged in service occupations (including construction contract-
ing and other service occupations of like character), trades or professions,
in the rendering of services, where as a necessary incident to the render-
ing of such service, transfer of all or a part of the tangible personal prop-
erty employed in connection with the rendering of said services is made
from the person engaged in the service occupation (including construction
contracting and other service occupations of like character), trade or
profession, to his customer or client.
In two cases 75 the Circuit Court of Sangamon County
upheld the application of the act to the proceeds of a trans-
action where title to personal property passed from the ven-
dor to the purchaser outside of the State of Illinois.7 These
cases have been docketed before the Supreme Court and
the conclusion reached will be of greatest significance.
In other cases arising under the act, the Supreme Court
has held (1) that the vendor of reconditioned auto parts
was not performing a service and that the proceeds of his
sales were subject to tax; 77 (2) that fur repairmen, on the
71 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E. (2d) 995 (1942).
72 380 IM. 63, 43 N.E. (24) 550 (1942).
73 Il. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 120, § 440.
74 See Herlihy Mid-Continent Co. v. Nudelman, 367 Inl. 600, 12 N.E. (2d) 638
(1938), and Material Service Corp. v. McKibbin, Circuit Court of Cook County,
Feb. 14, 1941, C. C. H. Illinois Taxation, Vol. 2, § 68-012, affirmed as to this point,
380 Ill. 226, 43 N.E. (2d) 939 (1942), not in the period of this survey.
75 Standard Oil Co. v. McKibbin, C. C. H. Illinois Taxation, Vol. 2, § 68-055, and
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Wright, C. C. H. Illinois Taxation, Vol. 2, § 68-061.
76 The act imposes a tax on those engaged in selling tangible personal property
at retail in this state: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 120, § 441.
77 Warshawsky & Co. v. Department of Finance, 377 Ill. 165, 36 N.E. (2d) 233
(1941).
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other hand, are engaged in a service occupation and that
the proceeds of their work, including the sale of the fur
used in repairs, are not subject to tax; 8 (3) that it is in-
cumbent upon the department to make a reassessment
within a reasonable time after the taxpayer's return has
been filed in order to impose an additional burden on the
taxpayer; 9 and (4) that the failure to file a return is a
misdemeanor within the meaning of the act regardless of
of the intention of the taxpayer in so failing to file.80
One case of general interest might be added, that of City
of Chicago v. McCausland.81 There the city had filed a peti-
tion on February 17, 1926, directed toward ascertaining the
just compensation for property to be taken in widening a
street. The verified report of the commissioners was filed
on May 26, 1926, specifying the amount of money to be paid.
Final judgment was entered on June 30, 1929. General taxes
for 1927, 1928 and 1929 were levied and assessed against
the property. On January 27, 1936, the amount fixed as just
compensation was deposited with the county treasurer. He,
however, refused to turn over the full amount to the prop-
erty owner, taking the position that the amount of the unpaid
taxes should be deducted from the award. In a suit to
determine this issue the court held that, when money is
paid under an award, "the title acquired relates back to
the time when the commissioners made their report," '82
consequently the tax liens could not be transferred to the
amount awarded.
TRADE REGULATIONS
Acting under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins,8 the federal circuit court of appeals, in Addresso-
graph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt & Man-
78 Mahon v. Nudelman, 377 Il1. 331, 36 N.E. (2d) 550 (1941), noted in 30 Ill. B. J.
214.
79 Feldstein v. Department of Finance, 377 Ill. 396, 36 N.E. (2d) 557 (1941).
80 People v. Player, 377 InI. 417, 36 N.E. (2d) 729 (1941).
81 379 Ill. 602, 41 N.E. (2d) 745 (1942), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvmw
359.
82 379 Ill. 602 at 606, 41 N.E. (2d) 745 at 748.
83 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
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ufacturing Company,4 applied the law of Illinois as pre-
viously announced in two appellate court decisions85 with a
resulting denial of recovery to the plaintiff who had charged
the defendant with unfair competition. It appeared therein
that the plaintiff had, at great expense, developed a system
of "addressing and writing of various data on many busi-
ness forms in a mechanical manner rather than manually." '"
Its chief source of profit resulted from the sale of its
address plates rather than from the machines in which they
were used. In fact, without the profits derived from the
plates, it could not afford the expense of maintenance and
expansion of its business system. After the expiration of the
plaintiff's patents, defendant manufactured and sold to users
of the plaintiff's machines certain address cards intended
solely for use in connection with the plaintiff's machines.
Not being burdened with the expense of making the ma-
chines, the defendant could produce and sell its cards at
less cost than the plaintiff. To increase its sales it according-
ly told customers of the plaintiff that the latter was a mon-
opolistic organization charging monopolistic prices. On this
state of facts recovery was denied. The court found no in-
tentional "palming off" within the narrow Illinois rule"7 nor
did it find any unfair competition. It is true that unfair
competition existed under the doctrine announced by the
United States Supreme Court in the Associated Press Case, s8
but the Illinois Appellate Court had declined to follow that
decision, so the court in the instant case felt constrained to
apply the local rule.
By House Bill 173, approved July 17, 1941, the legislature
has provided that it shall be unlawful to "conduct or trans-
act business in this State under an assumed name, or under
any designation, name or style, corporate or otherwise, oth-
er than the real name or names of the individual or in-
84 124 F. (2d) 706 (1942), cert. den.-U. S.-, 62 S. Ct. 1270, 86 L. Ed. 1023 (1942).
85 The Stevens-Davis Co. v. Mather & Co., 230 IlM. App. 45 (1923), and Soft Lite
Lens Co., Inc. v. Ritholz, 301 III. App. 100, 21 N.E. (2d) 835 (1939).
86 124 F. (2d) 706 at 707.
87 See cases cited in note 85 ante, followed in Rytex Co. v. Ryan, 126 F. (2d)
952 (1942).
88 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 39 S. Ct. 68,
63 L. Ed. 211 (1918).
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dividuals conducting or transacting such business '"" unless
an appropriate certificate is filed setting forth the name
under which the business is to be conducted and the names
of the individuals conducting it. 90 These requirements do
not apply to foreign or domestic corporations, nor to trusts
where the title to the trust property is vested in the trustee
who carries on the business in his name, nor to partner-
ships where the partnership name includes the true, real
name of such person or persons transacting the business of
the partnership. Violation of the act constitutes a misde-
meanor, and each day of continued violation is considered a
separate offense which may result in a fine of $25 to $100
and a jail sentence of from ten to thirty days.9 1
VIII. TORTS
In the field of libel and slander, the case of Kulesza v.
Chicago Daily News, Inc.,1 is worthy of comment. That
case grew out of an article published in the defendant's news-
paper which commented upon a meeting of persons pur-
portedly interested in a patent infringement suit held for the
purpose of soliciting funds with which to further prosecute
that suit. The article commented upon the history of the
unsuccessful litigation and, by implication, warned investors
that they would probably lose their money. The court upheld
the right of the newspaper to so comment because the con-
duct of the litigation and the campaign for the solicitation of
money were matters of public interest and concern, and
were, therefore, "legitimate subjects of criticism and com-
ment by a newspaper, so long as it does so fairly and with
an honest purpose."'
An interesting opinion on the doctrine of family discipline
was filed by the Appellate Court for the First District in the
case of Drake v. Thomas,' in which the court held that the
89 Laws 1941, I, 550; IMl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 96, § 4-8.
90 The certificate must be filed in the County Clerk's office in the county in
which the business is to be conducted or transacted.
91 Laws 1941, I, 551; IMl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 96, § 8.
1 311 Ill. App. 117, 35 N.E. (2d) 517 (1941).
2 311 Ill. App. 117 at 123, 35 N.E. (2d) 517 at 520.
3 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E. (2d) 889 (1941).
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW - 1941-1942
authority of a teacher over a pupil is a delegation of pa-
rental authority, saying:
The authority of a teacher over a pupil is a delegation of parental author-
ity, and where the teacher inflicts corporal punishment on a pupil, and he
is not actuated by malice and the punishment is not excessive or wanton,
the teacher is not liable.4
The court further held that the exclusion from evidence of a
note from the parent to the teacher requesting the latter to
correct the child was improper as such letter was an express
delegation of parental authority to the teacher to do what
could be done by way of correction.
The case of Citizens National Bank v. Joseph Kesl & Sons
Company' sustains the right of a mortgagee to sue in tres-
pass where soil is removed without permission from the
mortgaged premises. It was there pointed out that the mort-
gagor could maintain an action of trespass quare clausum
fregit and recover the value of the soil removed in its sev-
ered condition, and that the mortgagee also might maintain
an action against the third person for impairment of the
mortgage security, but that the recovery of the mortgagee
would be limited to the amount by which the wrongful acts
had impaired the mortgage security. It appeared, however,
that there had been an assignment of the mortgagor's cause
of action to the mortgagee which, therefore, entitled the
mortgagee to recover the entire damage done where other-
wise he might have recovered only nominal damages.
In the case of Racine Fuel Company v. 0. A. Rawlins,6 a
case brought on the theory of fraud and deceit, the court
held that conduct may amount to a representation. The court
pointed out, however, that this did not restrict the rule that
fraud is not presumed, but must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence and is not proved by mere suspicion.
Conduct amounting to a representation was defined as "any
conduct capable of being turned into a statement of fact,"
and, to be actionable, it was pointed out, it would be suffi-
4 310 ll. App. 57 at 63, 33 N.E. (2d) 889 at 891.
5 378 i. 428, 38 N.E. (2d) 734 (1942), noted in 20 CHcAo-KENT LAw REVIw 177,
affirming 309 m. App. 273, 33 N.E. (2d) 133 (1941).
6 377 M. 375, 36 N.E. (2d) 710 (1941), reversing 306 IlM. App. 580, 29 N.E. (2d)
387 (1940).
7 377 M1l. 375 at 380, 36 N.E. (2d) 710 at 712.
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cient if the proof showed such acts as would mislead a rea-
sonably cautious and prudent man in regard to the existence
of a fact forming a basis of or contributing to an inducement
to some change of position by him. In the instant case, how-
ever, mere silence upon receipt of an invoice was held not to
amount to a representation that the purchaser intended to
pay the market price of certain coal, when, in fact, he had
no such intention, particularly since the coal was delivered
to the purchaser on order solicited by the vendor's agent.
Another case dealing with fraud and deceit is that of Mal-
nick v. Rosenthal." Plaintiffs therein were builders and the
defendant was the seller of unimproved real estate from
whom the plaintiffs had purchased a one-half interest in cer-
tain parcels of land, giving notes for a part of the purchase
price. Suit was brought to enjoin the transfer of these notes
and for the recission and cancellation of the contract on the
ground that the plaintiffs had been induced to enter into the
contract by reason of fraudulent misrepresentations made
by the defendant. The misrepresentations were: (1) the de-
fendant had stated that all public improvements on the land
had been paid for; (2) that defendant had made arrange-
ments with local authorities for the release of tax liens; and
(3) that he had arranged with local authorities for a lower-
ing of building restrictions. The court cited with approval
the decisions in Bundesen v. Lewis9 and Dickinson v. Dickin-
son,10 cases based on almost parallel facts, and said:
A party in possession of his mental faculties is not justified in relying on
representations made, when he has ample opportunity to ascertain the
truth of the representations before he acts. When he is afforded the op-
portunity of knowing the truth of the representations, he is chargeable
with knowledge. If one does not avail himself of the means of knowledge
open to him, he cannot be heard to say he was deceived by misrepresen-
tations."
The court called attention to the fact that, in this case, the
plaintiffs were engaged in the building construction busi-
ness, and that the truth or falsity of each of the representa-
tions complained of was readily ascertainable by them, and
8 313 III. App. 249, 39 N.E. (2d) 767 (1942).
9 368 IM, 623, 15 N.E. (2d) 520 (1938).
10 305 IM. 521, 137 N.E. 468 (1922).
11 313 IM. App. 249 at 255, 39 N.E. (2d) 767 at 769.
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that it did not appear that the plaintiffs had made any effort
to determine the truth for themselves.
A nuisance case worthy of mention is Menolascino v. Supe-
rior Felt & Bedding Company,"2 in which the court held
that, in an action to recover damages for injuries to her
lungs caused by the discharge of cotton lint over the neigh-
borhood by the defendant's mattress factory, the contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff in living close by the factory
and also whether the defendant was negligent or careful,
were not issues in the case. Being an action for damages
based on a nuisance, the court properly held that questions
of negligence and contributory negligence were not involved.
The court also reiterated the doctrine that there is no pre-
scriptive right to commit a nuisance and stated that it was
immaterial to the case at bar that the defendant had located
first in the neighborhood and that the plaintiff had later
moved to a house across the street from the factory, for the
plaintiff was under no duty to move to avoid such injuries.
In the course of a year a good many cases involving negli-
gence arise, most of which offer no new principles. A few
negligence cases, however, deserve comment. Thus, a ques-
tion of contributory negligence was presented in the case
of Blachek v. City Ice & Fuel Company," and turned upon
the issue of whether or not the parking of an automobile upon
a highway without lights by the plaintiff's intestate could be
considered as contributory negligence. The court held that
such parking was not, in and of itself, contributory negli-
gence saying:
The rule is that negligence and contributory negligence are questions of
fact for the jury. They become questions of law only when the evidence
is so clearly insufficient to establish negligence or due care that all rea-
sonable minds would reach the conclusion that there was no negligence
or that there was contributory negligence . . . We also agree with the
plaintiff's contention that the mere parking of an automobile upon the
highway without any light is not of itself negligence and that all the facts
and circumstances must be taken into consideration to determine whether
defendants were negligent and whether plaintiff's intestate was in the
exercise of due care.' 4
12 313 IMI. App. 557, 40 N.E. (2d) 813 (1942).
18 311 IMl. App. 1, 35 N.E. (2d) 416 (1941).
14 311 Ill. App. 1 at 13, 35 N.E. (2d) 416 at 422.
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The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was relied on by the
plaintiff in the case of Halowatsky v. Central Greyhound
Lines, Inc. 5 Plaintiff therein was a passenger on a bus and
was injured when the moving bus fell through the pavement
while proceeding through a city. The evidence established
that a broken sewer had caused the underlying sand and
soil to be washed away thus causing the pavement to col-
lapse under the weight of the bus. It was the contention of
the plaintiff that a prima facie case of negligence against
the defendant carrier was made out by showing that she was
a passenger at the time of the injury. It was held, however,
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply because
all the instrumentalities contributing to the accident were
not under the carrier's control. It was pointed out that the
carrier had no control over the sewer or the street, and that
there was no causal connection between the alleged exces-
sive speed of the bus and the accident which caused plain-
tiff's injuries.
Kosicki v. S. A. Healy Company'6 involved the negligent
use of explosives and combustibles and required a construc-
tion of Section 19 of the act creating the Sanitary District of
Chicago. 7 The action was brought against an independent
contractor, employed by the Sanitary District to construct a
sewer, and sought to enforce the common law liability of
such contractor for the negligent use of explosives resulting
in injury to property. The act had created a statutory rem-
edy against the Sanitary District in favor of a property owner
injured through the construction of improvements. The court
held that the remedy given by the statute was not exclusive,
hence permitted recovery against the contractor.
In Edwards v. Hill-Thomas Lime & Cement Company,8 a
case involving contributory negligence, the trial court had
instructed the jury, in substance, that no greater degree of
care was required of the plaintiff than an ordinarily prudent
15 311 Il. App. 127, 35 N.E. (2d) 541 (1941).
16 312 IU. App. 307, 38 N.E. (2d) 525 (1941), affirmed in 380 Ill. 298, 44 N.E. (2d)
27 (1942), not in the period of this survey.
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 42, § 339.
18 378 IMl. 180, 37 N.E. (2d) 801 (1941), reversing 309 IMI. App. 168, 32 N.E. (2d)
945 (1941).
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person would exercise "in the situation in which the plaintiff
was placed as shown by the evidence." This instruction was
held erroneous for the reason that it entirely ignored the
question, an issue in the case, as to whether or not the plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence in placing himself
in the situation referred to in the instruction. Thus, it is
shown, an ordinarily acceptable definition of the standard
of care required of a person may be altered by the issue of
contributory negligence. The vice in the instruction lay in
assuming that the plaintiff was not guilty of any careless-
ness in being in the position in which he found himself at
the time of the injury.
Another negligence case, that of Kuzminski v. Waser,19
caused the court to define the degree of care that a motorist
owes to children playing in the street. The court stated:
A person operating a motor vehicle along the streets of a city is, bound
to recognize the fact that children will be found playing in the street and
that they may sometimes attempt to cross the street unmindful of its
dangers, and the driver owes the children the duty of reasonable and
ordinary care under the circumstances. 20
In Bartolucci v. Falleti2' the court defined wilful and wan-
ton conduct by saying:
In order that one may be held guilty of wilful or wanton conduct, it must
be shown that he, was conscious of his conduct, and conscious, from his
knowledge of existing conditions, that injury would likely or probably
result from his conduct, and that with reckless indifference to conse-
quences he consciously and intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted
some known duty which produced the injurious result. 22
Following such definition, it became necessary for the court
to hold that where the defendant was descending a hill with
his car, in which the plaintiff was riding as a guest, and a
wheel came off because the bolts sheared through, thus caus-
ing the car to turn over, there being no showing that the de-
fendant knew of the unsafe condition of the car or by the
exercise of reasonable care could have known of it, the con-
duct of the defendant did not meet the definition. The deci-
sion is entirely consistent with the established doctrine that
19 314 IlM. App. 438, 41 N.E. (2d) 1008 (1942).
20 314 IMI. App. 438 at 454, 41 N.E. (2d) 1008 at 1015.
21 314 Ill. App. 551, 41 N.E. (2d) 777 (1942).
22 314 IM. App. 551 at 558, 41 N.E. (2d) 777 at 780.
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one who invites another to ride with him does not guarantee
to the guest a sound automobile, but that his duty extends
only to refraining from increasing the danger which the
guest assumes upon entering the automobile, or from adding
a new danger.
An interesting case on the degree of care required of ex-
hibitors and showmen in providing proper seating space for
paid customers is to be found in Wickstrom v. Ringling
Brothers, Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Incorporat-
ed,23 which held that proof that the seats provided were of
the standard type used by circuses would not prove ordinary
and reasonable care under the circumstances surrounding
that case. The question was, properly, whether the defendant
had used reasonable care to provide proper seating. Further,
the testimony of a park employee, as an expert witness,
that he had inspected and approved the seating, was prop-
erly excluded because it was not shown that he was guided
by any ordinance, code or specifications.
One case on proximate causation merits discussion. In
Briske v. Village of Burnham, 24 the village had vacated a
portion of a public street located therein, following which a
heavy barrier had been erected across the street to close off
the vacated portion. There was evidence tending to show
that the village was negligent in not placing warning signs
along the used portion of the street to warn motorists that
they were approaching the barricade. The evidence also es-
tablished that the driver of the automobile in which the
plaintiff was riding was negligent in not seeing the barricade
in time to stop the car and prevent it from crashing thereon.
The plaintiff relied on the theory of concurrent negligence
to establish the liability of the village. The circuit court over-
ruled defendant's motion for a directed verdict, but such de-
cision was reversed by the appellate court." The Supreme
Court, in affirming the judgment dismissing the suit, said:
If a negligent act or omission does nothing more than furnish a condi-
tion making an injury possible, and such condition, by the subsequent
independent act of a third person, causes an injury, the two acts are not
23 313 Ill. App. 640, 40 N.E. (2d) 585 (1942).
24 379 Ill. 193, 39 N.E. (2d) 976 (1942).
25 308 IMI. App. 531, 32 N.E. (2d) 349 (1941).
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concurrent and the existence of the condition is not the proximate cause
of the injury.26
Inasmuch as the negligent act of the driver of the car was
the intervening and efficient cause of the accident, it broke
the causal connection between the negligence of the village
and the resultant injury.
26 379 M. 193 at 199, 39 N.E. (2d) 976 at 979.
